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“Historically, privacy was almost implicit, because it was hard to find
and gather information. But in the digital world, whether it’s digital
cameras or satellites or just what you click on, we need to have more
explicit rules - not just for governments but for private companies.” 1
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1
Steven Levy, Bill Gates and President Bill Clinton on the NSA, Safe Sex, and
American Exceptionalism, WIRED (Nov. 12, 2013, 6:30 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2013/11/bill-gates-bill-clinton-wired/ (quoting Bill Gate’s response
to the discovery of widespread data collection by the NSA and how surveillance and
security must strike a balance).
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The evolution of information technology catalyzes economic globalization as
larger quantities of data are easily stored, processed, and circulated across the
globe in a matter of seconds.2 Online shopping, also known as e-commerce, has
contributed significantly to the issue of data privacy because records are
instantly updated with a large breadth of customer information.3 While the
simple disclosure of a name, address, phone number, and credit card number
may not seem like much information, this basic data enables algorithms to
compile more complete personal data profiles.4 For example, a website with
registered accounts is able to track consumer search and purchase histories.5
Predictive algorithms process information to predict buyer behavior, such as
what products a consumer is likely to purchase as well as the most effective type,
and placement, of advertisements.6 These activities have become the norm, as
consumers are either numb or oblivious to the information they consent to
disclosing to companies.7 After all, the only way a consumer can utilize online
2
Gao Shangquan, Economic Globalization: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/2000/CDP/1, at 1 (2000),
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp2000_1.pdf
(discussing the rapid growth of technology and its ability to cut costs and expedite
communications as well as providing statistics to show how even sixteen years ago,
technology was beginning to shape the global economic landscape);
see also Nicolas Pologeorgis, How Globalization Affects Developed Countries,
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:59 PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/globalization-developed-countries.asp
(explaining how globalization has continued to increase as newer, more efficient
technologies promote international trade).
3
The Importance of Gathering and Using Demographic Data for Fulfillment, FLOSHIP,
http://www.floship.com/importance-gathering-using-demographic-data-fulfillment (last
visited Nov. 13, 2018) (detailing how online shopping and the growth of e-commerce has
rapidly expanded the amount and types of data companies can instantaneously collect and
analyze to predict consumer spending, to target advertising, and to improve customer
relations, among other many benefits) [hereinafter Demographic Data]; see also Adam C.
Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing With It), BUS.
NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625businesses-collecting-data.html (discussing means of data collection and potential business
uses for consumer data).
4
Demographic Data, supra note 3 (stating that simple purchase data is the surface
level of information that companies can collect as technology and analytics continue to
improve).
5
See Nicole Fallon, Boosting Customer Loyalty with Big Data, FOX BUS. (Apr. 28,
2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2014/04/28/boosting-customer-loyalty-withbig-data.html (reporting the benefits of customer loyalty programs, the emphasis of
companies on targeting repeat buyers, and the ability to track and predict purchase
tendencies).
6
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secret, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_r=0.
7
Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV.
BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-
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services is to agree to a company’s privacy policies, accept the internet cookies,
and to supply their personal information.8 However, until a data breach occurs,
consumers continue to carelessly accept these agreements to information
privacy.9
Companies store large quantities of personal data that can easily be traced
back to individuals.10 Corporate data mining and collecting is a global practice,
so governments must ensure the protection of consumer data beyond industry
and individual company levels.11 With the continual growth of e-commerce, the
spread of consumer information transcends national borders.12 After all,
consumer data concerns citizens from around the world, so each government
must do its part in ensuring its protection.13
In 2000, the European Union and the United States, as two of the largest
economic markets in the world, entered into the U.S.–E.U. Safe Harbor
Agreement.14 Under this Agreement, the European Union and the United States
reconciled existing gaps between the European Union’s data protection

and-trust (discussing how companies use general consumer consent to gather as much
consumer data as possible, even if not useful at the present time, and how customers do not
know standard data collection practices or the breadth of the data they are giving up).
8
Id.
9
New FireEye Research Reveals the Impact of High-Profile Security Breaches on U.S.
Consumers’ Trust of Brands, FIREEYE (May 12, 2016),
http://investors.fireeye.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=970718 (releasing studies on
consumer reactions and attitudes toward large data breaches); see also Zach Walker, The
Impact of Data Breaches and Customer Loyalty, RIPPLESHOT BLOG (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://info.rippleshot.com/blog/data-breaches-and-customer-loyalty (discussing prevalence
and dangers of data breaches).
10 Morey et al., supra note 7.
11 Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 355, 356 (2015) (introducing the concept of data protection and the ways in
which consumers value its collection, use, and protection against companies across the
world; companies that have evolved in storing, processing, and selling data to third-parties,
or giving it to the government for security purposes); Courtney M. Bowman, A Primer on
the GDPR: What You Need to Know, PROSKAUER (Dec. 23, 2015),
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/12/articles/european-union/a-primer-on-the-gdprwhat-you-need-to-know/ (explaining how the E.U.’s GDPR increases protections for its
citizens).
12 John C. Eustice, Flying into the cloud without falling: understanding the intersection
between data privacy laws and cloud computing solutions, THOMSON REUTERS,
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/understanding-data-privacy-and-cloudcomputing (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
13 Brookman, supra note 11, at 357 (describing the responses of nations around the
world to personal data as it becomes easier to access); Bowman, supra note 11.
14 Commission Staff Working Document on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by
the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related FAQs Issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 8 [hereinafter Safe
Harbor].
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requirements15 and the United States’ privacy laws to allow for the legal transfer
of personal information collected in Europe of European citizens.16 On October
6, 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Safe
Harbor Agreement in the landmark case of Maximillian Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner.17 The Court of Justice emphasized in its holding the
significant data privacy and data protection policy gaps, and the differences that
exist between the European Union and the United States.18 In the European
Union, citizens possess fundamental rights to both privacy19 and the protection
of personal data.20 The E.U. has embraced this concept through its adoption and
continual evolution of legislation that guarantees individual’s privacy and data
protection from misuse by the government and companies alike.21 In contrast,
there is no explicit individual right to consumer data privacy in the United States
nor an overarching regulatory scheme.22
In 2014, under the Safe Harbor Agreement, the European Union and the
United States participated in transatlantic trade valued over $1.09 trillion and
approximately $4 trillion in parallel trade of stocks and investments.23 The
investment of United States based companies into the European economy, and
Id. at 10.
Id. at 7; MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44257,
U.S.-EU PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 1 (2016) (giving an overview of
U.S. and European data privacy laws and a history of their interaction).
17 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R., https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362&from=EN
(invalidating the Safe Harbor Agreement between the European Union and the United States
in a case arising out of an Irish Facebook user’s suit claiming an unlawful transfer of his
personal information to Facebook servers located in the United States due to inadequate data
protection against the United States’ National Security Agency’s surveillance practices).
18 Id.
19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 393, 397.
20 Id. at art. 8.
21 Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1973 (2013) (discussing how the European Union’s
proactive approach to privacy and its continual efforts for improvement has caused countries
outside the E.U. to develop similar stringent approaches to privacy protection).
22 Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet
Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 661, 668 (1999) (“Individual privacy in the United States is protected
through a combination of constitutional guarantees, federal and state statutes, regulations,
and voluntary industry codes of conduct that apply to the public and private sectors in
different ways.”).
23 Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the Subcomm. on
Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 21 (2015)
(statement of Dr. Joshua P. Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
program at the Brookings Institute).
15
16
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vice versa, drove this economic boom where “[s]ixty-one percent of U.S.
imports from the EU and 33 percent of EU imports from the U.S. consist of intra
firm trade.”24 Roughly 4,500 U.S. companies operated under the Safe Harbor
Agreement to allow for the transatlantic data transfers.25 Due to such heavy
reliance on the Safe Harbor, its invalidation has put the international economy
in jeopardy and companies are left wondering whether they are adequately
protected from liability in conducting transatlantic data transfers.26 Without the
Safe Harbor Agreement’s protections, United States based companies must
consider alternative mechanisms to ensure compliance with the European
Union’s stringent standards or otherwise face harsh liability.27
The European Union and the United States recently entered into the E.U.–
U.S. Privacy Shield to restore privacy protection in transatlantic data flows.28
While quickly enacted with stronger data protections, stark contrasts remain
between data protection regulations in the European Union and the United
States.29 The European Union is the global standard for international privacy
law, and is continuously developing, while the United States continues to

24 Id. at 23 (stating these statistics dwarf those of other United States trade partners
where “intra firm trade as a share of U.S. imports from the Pacific Rim (37.2 percent), and
South/Central America (37 percent)” account for a much smaller percentage of international
trade).
25 Weiss & Archick, supra note 16.
26 European Court of Justice Invalidates U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement, BARNES &
THORNBURG LLP (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.btlaw.com/data-security-and-privacy-andediscovery-data—document-management-law-alert—-european-court-of-justice-invalidatesus-eu-safe-harbor-agreement-10-09-2015.
27 Brian McCormac, Invalidation of Safe Harbor, EU to US Data Security Measures
Tested, Failed, BROWN WINICK (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.brownwinick.com/newsblogs/legal-news/invalidation-of-safe-harbor-eu-to-us-data-security-measures-testedfailed.aspx (recommending companies take proactive steps to protect their liability while
continuing to conduct transatlantic data transfers following the Safe Harbor Agreement’s
invalidation. Steps include: reviewing data transfer processes using strict privacy principles,
implementing the E.U. Model Contract Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) as
alternative adequacy measures, and ensuring that company privacy policies are accurate and
complied with); see also European Court of Justice, supra note 26 (providing
recommendations on how companies can protect themselves from liability in the aftermath
of the Safe Harbor Agreement’s invalidation); Francoise Gilbert, EU General Data
Protection Regulation: What Impact For Business Established Outside the European Union,
19 NO. 11 J. INTERNET J. 3, 3-6 (2016) (“Today, less than 100 companies have sought and
obtained approval of their BCRs, even though using BCRs as a method to legalize crossborder transfers has been available for approximately 10 years”).
28 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/216, EU Commission and United
States agree on new framework for transatlantic data flows: EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2,
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm.
29 See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106
GEO. L.J. 117, 120 (2017) (outlining policy differences between U.S. and E.U. despite the
effort behind the implementation of the Privacy Shield).
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embrace an antiquated, ineffective approach.30 Additionally, with the United
States’ view towards international cooperation shifting, negotiations will likely
become more tense and result in significant delays.31 For companies, this means
that international data transfers and trade will continue to take place without the
security of agreements that bridge the gap between internal data privacy laws.32
Congress must acknowledge that it is unsustainable to continue to simply
contract around higher global standards through trade agreements destined for
failure.33 Congress should ease the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) burden
to promulgate rules within the data privacy context.34 However, even if Congress
does not ease the burden, the FTC must promulgate a rule that establishes a
standard for general data protection and requires industry agencies to monitor
data protection compliance throughout the States.35

30 See generally Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy
Law—Its Theoretical Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, 50 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 53 (2014) (discussing the reach that European and U.S. privacy law has on the rest
of the world, how the emergence of rapid technological innovation shapes global data
privacy, and how international data privacy law is likely to progress).
31 See Toluse Olorunnipa et al., Trump Revamps U.S. Trade Focus by Pulling Out of
Pacific Deals, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017, 7:25 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-23/trump-said-to-sign-executiveorder-on-trans-pacific-pact-monday (showing the Trump presidency has taken an inward,
protectionist approach. Within a week of taking office, President Trump has taken executive
action to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and vowed to
reevaluate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).
32 See Mark Scott, U.S. and Europe Fail to Meet Deadline for Data Transfer Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), at B1 (discussing how in the absence of an agreement between the
European Union and the United States, companies are relying upon untested contractual
measures to reduce liability in data transfers. Concerns over foreign legal remedies and the
use of transferred data have highlighted key areas of concern and discrepancy between the
foreign policies).
33 See also Eric Shimp, Data Privacy in the Transatlantic Trade Agreement? US-EU
Ponder the Way Forward, ALSTON & BIRD: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. BLOG,
http://www.alstonprivacy.com/data-privacy-in-the-transatlantic-trade-agreement-us-euponder-the-way-forward (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (discussing how data protection and
privacy concerns have already arisen in T-TIP negotiations); see generally Ioanna
Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-E.U. in Data Privacy Protection, 36 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 161 (2014) (discussing how an international lack of trust in the United
States’ legal emphasis on privacy is threatening the negotiations for increased trade
partnerships because separate agreements are necessary to protect the European Union’s
fundamental right to privacy).
34 Jugpreet Mann, Small Steps for Congress, Huge Steps for Online Privacy, 37
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365, 388 (2015).
35 See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 429, 472-76 (1997) (discussing how the increasing globalization of trade and the
importance of data collection serve as impetuses for the United States to adopt federal
privacy standards to ease international data transfer relations); see also Amanda C. Border,
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Part I of this Note provides an overview of the sectoral privacy law landscape
currently in the United States. Part II discusses privacy law in the European
Union and how its development of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) is creating a quasi-global standard for data protection. Part III forecasts
the long-term impact that the GDPR and rising global data privacy standards
will have on U.S. data privacy laws and international data transfers.
Additionally, Part III argues that the FTC must promulgate a rule to create a
uniform set of data standards across the states and form data compliance
agencies to oversee domestic and international affairs.
I. THE ROLE OF PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE U.S.
Although the right to privacy is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution,
judicial and legislative interpretations have acknowledged that individuals have
certain privacy rights.36 While this right has not been extended by the Court to
protect private personal information (PII),37 several states have enumerated a
right of consumer data and personal privacy within their constitutions.38 This
attitude toward personal privacy rights has formed the basis for its protection in
the United States.39 Rather than a preventative, singular rule of law, data
protection in the United States is governed by a reactive patchwork regulatory
system.40 Although federal statutes govern the protection of consumer data in
Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation in the
United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363, 384 (proposing that “the
United States should shift away from its “piecemeal approach” to data privacy.”).
36 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (demonstrating how the Supreme Court has
relied on interpretations of the Bill of Rights to conclude that “a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy [do] exist under the Constitution”); see also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (developing a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test to gauge whether a person has a right to privacy, based on having (1) an actual
expectation of privacy that (2) society deems reasonable and is prepared to recognize); see
also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974) (noting that a “right to privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States”).
37 Tan, supra note 22, at 669.
38 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by their nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending liberty . .
. and privacy.”).
39 See generally Tan, supra note 22, at 662-63 (noting that nearly every country
recognizes a right to privacy; however, differences amongst comprehensive laws are
apparent based on the level of emphasis that individual countries place on this right).
40 Ieuan Jolly, Data protection in the United States: overview, PRACTICAL L. (July 1,
2017), http://us.practicallaw.com/6-502-0467 (emphasizing that rather than enacting a single
federal law, the United States utilizes “a patchwork system of federal and state laws and
regulations that can sometimes overlap, dovetail and contradict one another.”); see also Tan,
supra note 22, at 671 (“Presently, there is no comprehensive law in the United States
guaranteeing privacy rights in personal information. There are, however, various privacy
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particular sectors, such as private health information,41 financial information,42
and electronic communications,43 many industries fall outside the scope of these
regulations.44 Instead, a system of company self-regulation governs consumer
data protection in the United States.45 Privacy law in the U.S. is primarily
enforced by the FTC46 and state privacy laws.47
A. The FTC and its Role on Data Protection in the United States
The FTC was not originally formed to function as a privacy protection
agency; however, that is now one of its primary duties.48 The FTC’s mission
and security statutes that address specific privacy needs.”).
41 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1302(a)
(2012) (explaining that the power to regulate the governing of privacy and medical
regulations is given to the Department of Health and Human Services under the Act).
42 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012) (requiring privacy
notice and opt-out rights for consumers when financial institutions attempt to share personal
data with other companies).
43 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002)
(protecting personal information on the Internet from unauthorized government
surveillance).
44 Stephen Cobb, Data privacy and data protection: U.S. law and legislation, ESET 6
(2016) (stating large sectors, such as airline reservation data, sales and marketing prospect
databases, and library borrowing records fall outside the scope of federal privacy protection
laws); see also Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2015) “The FTC has filled gaps when
a number of large industries have not been regulated by federal data protection statutes.”.
45 Tan, supra note 22, at 674 (detailing how the United States’ regulatory system for
online privacy protection consists of self-regulation where companies establish their own
policies).
46 Jolly, supra note 40, at 1, 17 (“The FTC is the primary U.S. enforcer of national
privacy laws” and “has brought many enforcement actions against companies failing to
comply with posted privacy policies and for the unauthorized disclosure of personal data.”).
47 See id. at 3 (“There are many laws at the state level that regulate the collection and
use of personal data.”); Cal. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (2018) (discussing the newly
enacted California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 which demonstrates how privacy law is
enforced on the state level by stating that “any consumer whose nonencrypted or
nonredacted personal information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration,
theft, or disclosure as a result of a business’ violation of the duty to implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to
protect the personal information” may institute certain civil actions).
48 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)) (stating that the FTC was primarily formed to
“prevent persons, partnerships, or Corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce”); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006))
(showing that one of the primary purposes of the FTC was to prevent the acquisition of “the
whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any
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does not specifically address the protection of consumer data privacy; however,
its power to pursue companies for unfair and deceptive practices now includes
data practices.49 Modern interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act) prohibit unfair or deceptive practices with regard to online and offline
privacy, data security policies of the company, and the company’s failure to
safeguard consumers’ personal information.50 While the FTC’s “unfair and
deceptive” authority under § 5 of the FTC Act broadens the FTC’s jurisdiction
and scope of authority,51 certain industries remain exempt.52 Only the FTC can
enforce the FTC Act, and therefore, private causes of action are not possible.53
Instead, the government and U.S. consumers must rely upon FTC orders to
obtain injunctive remedies, and fine companies accordingly.54 While advocates
activity affecting commerce,” when the intention of the person seeking to acquire such
assets was to lessen competition or to create a monopoly); Andrew Serwin, The Federal
Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of
Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 814-15 (2011) (explaining that the “FTC was
originally created in 1914 in order to protect competition among businesses” and the
establishment of the FTC occurred concurrently with the Clayton Act, which focused on
antitrust law, to ensure that businesses operated on a level playing field).
49 See About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited
Oct. 20, 2016) (stating that the FTC’s mission is to prevent business practices that are
“anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair” to consumers, to enhance “informed consumer
choice and public understanding of the competitive process”, and to accomplish this
“without unduly burdening legitimate business activity”); Division of Privacy and Identity
Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureauconsumer-protection/our-divisions/division-privacy-and-identity (last visited Sept. 23, 2018)
(discussing that in response to growing concerns regarding data privacy, the FTC created a
subdivision focused solely on data privacy issues).
50 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 814 (explaining that through amendments to section 5
of the FTCA in 1938, “the FTCA was extended to cover consumers, primarily through the
addition of authority to address unfair and deceptive acts or practices,” which has been
interpreted to include safeguarding personal information); Jolly, supra note 40, at 1 (“The
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) is a federal consumer protection law
that prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to offline and online
privacy and data security policies.”); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2235 (explaining
how under the FTC Act, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful” and when companies fail to live up to promises made in their
privacy policies, the FTC considers this a deceptive trade practice that can be prohibited
under the Act).
51 See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (stating that
under the relevant section of the act “unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful” and the FTC has the power to regulate said methods and practices).
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (explaining that examples of industries outside the scope of
the FTC’s § 5 authority include financial institutions, airlines, non-profits, and
telecommunications carriers, among others).
53 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFO. PRIVACY L. 848-49 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015).
54 See Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009) (defining an injunction as
“a court order commanding or preventing an action”); see 15 U.S.C. § 45 (l) (stating that
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for the federal regulation of data privacy and security, separate from the FTC,
have introduced numerous bills to Congress, such as the Personal Data Privacy
and Security Act of 2014;55 the Data Security Act of 2014;56 and the Data
Security Act of 2015,57 Congress continues to balk at passing federal data
privacy legislation.58 Since the invalidation of the Safe Harbor Agreement, the
United States’ only recourse to buffering its data privacy law regime has been
through the enactment of the Judicial Redress Act of 2015,59 which primarily
concerns government use of personal data.60
“any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission after it
has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United
States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to
the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of
the United States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense,
except that in a case of a violation through continuing failure to obey or neglect to obey a
final order of the Commission, each day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be
deemed a separate offense. In such actions, the United States district courts are empowered
to grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem
appropriate in the enforcement of such final orders of the Commission”); see 15 U.S.C. § 53
(explaining that “whenever the Commission has reason to believe . . . that any person,
partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced
by the Federal Trade [Commission] . . . may bring suit in a district court of the United States
to enjoin any such act or practice,” with some limitations); see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra
note 53 (describing how the FTC cannot subject first-time offending companies to fines
under § 5. Instead, the FTC can only issue fines when a company violates an existing
consent decree previously entered stemming from an earlier § 5 violation).
55 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th Cong. (2d Sess.
2014) (describing the purpose of the bill was to “prevent and mitigate identity theft, to
ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties,
law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security breaches, fraudulent
access, and misuse of personally identifiable information.”).
56 Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (stating the purpose
of this bill was to “protect information relating to consumers, to require notice of security
breaches, and for other purposes.”).
57 Data Security Act of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) (revising Data
Security Act of 2014 but with the same stated purpose).
58 See J. Caleb Boggs III. & Lauren Donoghue, Congress taking action to protect data
security, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5f0404e-d581-4911-aa50-eeea8921b60d;
Conor Dougherty, Push for Internet Privacy Rules Moves to Statehouses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/technology/internet-privacy-statelegislation-illinois.html.
59 Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (2016) (authorizing
the Attorney General to designate foreign countries or specific organizations whose citizens
may then bring civil suits under the Privacy Act of 1974 against certain U.S. government
agencies for unlawful disclosures of records transferred from a foreign country pursuant to
criminal prosecution).
60 Eric Geller, Everything You Need to Know About the Big New Data-Privacy Big in
Congress, DAILY DOT (Feb. 24, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-isthe-judicial-redress-act-europe-data-privacy-bill; H. Jacqueline Brehmer, Data Localization:
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The FTC has developed accountability standards that delineate best practices
for companies using consumer data within their specific industry.61 However,
companies do not have to accept these practices due to their voluntary nature.62
While the FTC can prescribe interpretive rules and general standards,63 it has
minimal practical authority to make binding rules.64 From a practical standpoint,
the FTC’s rulemaking authority is a highly burdensome procedural process
known as Magnuson-Moss65 authority.66 Due to this burdensome process, the
FTC has not used its rulemaking power in over thirty-two years, leaving
companies and industries with general policy statements and interpretive rules.67
Companies that accept these standards are accountable to the FTC and are liable
for acts or practices deemed unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act.68 NonThe Unintended Consequences of Privacy Litigation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 941-42 (2018)
(stating the Judicial Redress Act expands civil redress of surveillance by federal agencies to
foreign nationals).
61 THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY L. REV. 148 (Alan Charles
Raul ed. 2014) (explaining these standards have led to best practices like the opt-out for
cookies and the “about advertising” icon); see Privacy & Data Security Update (2016), FTC,
Oct. 22, 2018, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016#rules
(detailing the FTC’s various discussions and reports on how businesses should operate to
protect consumer data under the “Consumer Education and Business Guidance” section).
62 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61.
63 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2006) (granting
the FTC power to prescribe interpretive rules and general statements of policy, but not those
regarding “the regulation of the development and utilization of the standards and
certification activities pursuant to this section”).
64 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (stating that the “Commission shall have no authority under
this subchapter, other than its authority under this section, to prescribe any rule with respect
to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of
section 45(a)(1) of this title)”).
65 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act – Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (affirming the FTC’s legislative authority to make
rules, subject to first conducting an industry wide investigation, preparing draft staff reports,
proposing a rule, and engaging in a series of public hearings, including cross-examination).
66 Beth DeSimone & Amy Mudge, Is Congress Putting the FTC on Steroids?, SELLER
BEWARE BLOG (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2010/04/iscongress-putting-the-ftc-on-steroids.html; see also Magdalena Gathani, Internet of Things
Report: The FTC Overstepped its Agency Rulemaking Authority, 9 BUS. PUBL. ADMIN.
STUD. 27, 27-8 (2016), https://www.bpastudies.org/bpastudies/article/viewFile/203/380
(describing the FTC’s current rulemaking authority, and how some view the issuing of best
practices and recommendations as overstepping the FTC’s authority).
67 Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Association of
National Advertisers: Advertising Law and Public Policy Conference (Mar. 18, 2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/association-nationaladvertisers-advertising-law-and-public-policy-conference-prepareddelivery/100318nationaladvertisers.pdf (“The requirements to promulgate a rule under [the
Magnuson-Moss Act] are so onerous that the agency has not proposed a new [MagnusonMoss Act] rule in 32 years.”).
68 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61; Cases and Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (showing
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compliant acts or practices include inadequate protection of consumer personal
data, failure to post or comply with company privacy policies, and lack of notice
for privacy policy revisions.69 The FTC uses two models to promote consumer
privacy: (1) a notice-and-choice model, characterized by the fair information
practice principles70 (2) and a harm-based approach.71
In 2000, the FTC first used the notice-and-choice model in an effort to have
Congress require businesses to comply with the Fair Information Practice
Principles.72 The FTC proposed that Congress enact several substantive
principles to promote consumer privacy in organizational processes, including
“data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention and disposal
practices, and data accuracy.”73 Though unsuccessful in convincing Congress to
enact legislation to cover this area, the FTC has used its authority under Section
45 of the FTC Act to promote consumer data protection.74
Section 45 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair and deceptive practices.75
Deceptive practices are found when there is a “material” misleading
representation, practice, or omission, when viewed from the perspective of a

all actions filed by the FTC against corporations under its Section five authority, including
those specifically for privacy violation; see, e.g., Atl. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 381
U.S. 357, 367 (1965) (finding that ‘unfair practices’ is a flexible and evolving concept, best
left to FTC interpretation so that it may bring future suits to hold companies accountable for
their actions).
69 Jolly, supra note 40.
70 Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum from Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on The Fair Information Practice Principles: Framework for
Privacy Policy (on file with author) (describing the Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPPs) that govern the use of personally identifiable information (PII) are: Transparency,
Individual Participation, Purpose Specification, Data Minimization, Use Limitation, Data
Quality and Integrity, Security, and Accountability and Auditing. The memorandum
elaborates on the meaning of each principle).
71 Serwin, supra note 48, at 817-22 (discussing the evolution of the FTC’s role in
policing the right to privacy. The right to protection of privacy and information security was
not a reasoning for the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act. § 5 of the FTC Act
embraced privacy issues as another way for the FTC to combat unfair and deceptive
practices).
72 FTC Staff Report on Internet of things: Privacy & Security in a connecting world,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, at v (Jan. 2015).
73 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at i, vii (2012).
74 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2017, at 1-8
(2017) (citing lawsuits and enforcement actions brought by the FTC in 2017 to protect
consumer data privacy both domestically and abroad).
75 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
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reasonably acting consumer.76 When examining the consumer’s likely detriment
upon reliance of a deceptive act or practice, there is often a presumption of injury
and actual harm.77 Under this model, deception serves as the basis for the FTC’s
authority to regulate consumer privacy protection in all industries not
specifically targeted by federal law.78 Under Section 45, the FTC is able to bring
actions against companies for using deceptive practices. There are two ways in
which the FTC can bring suit: (1) either on its own or (2) upon referrals, from
either E.U. data protection authorities or third-party private dispute resolution
providers.79 Critics have claimed that this notice and choice enforcement model
is impractical because it results in implementations of lengthy, incomprehensible
privacy statements which do not benefit consumers, and are not responsive to a
rapidly changing technological environment.80
The FTC has adopted the harm-based approach as the primary enforcement
model.81 This model shifts from a focus on deception to a focus on unfairness,
where an emphasis is placed on the likelihood of substantial injury rather than
on business practices.82 Application of the harm-based enforcement model has
resulted in the development of four privacy tort causes of action: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of name or likeness; (3) public disclosure of
private facts; and (4) dissemination of false information.83 This privacy tort
cause of action model has been criticized for its inability to address all potential
privacy harms and to adapt to the evolving technological environment.84 The
following subsections detail the FTC’s roles in data privacy and protection as

76 Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, responding to
an inquiry on FTC enforcement policy for deceptive acts and practices from Congressman
John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Comm. on Energy Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) (on
file with author),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstm
t.pdf.
77 Id.
78 15 U.S.C. § 45.
79 Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the Subcomm. on
Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 21 (2015)
(statement of Dr. Joshua P. Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
program at the Brookings Institute).
80 Serwin, supra note 48, at 816; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73, at 2.
81 Serwin, supra note 48, at 842-43.
82 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) in explaining that “[t]o be ‘unfair,’ a practice must be one
that ‘[1] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers [2] which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.”).
83 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 288.
84 Serwin, supra note 48, at 816-20.
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(1) a self-regulating body and (2) a foreign ambassador for data privacy.85
1. The FTC as a Self-Regulating Body
In a legal landscape riddled with gaps, the FTC rules have been compared to
a privacy common law.86 Though the law does not require companies to enact
specific practices or privacy policies, the FTC can use its authority under Section
45 to bring actions against companies for unfair and deceptive practices.87 The
FTC can only bring suits against companies for Section 45 violations, which
reduces the number of claims filed.88 Additionally, the majority of FTC cases
against companies end in settlements or consent decrees to cease deceptive and
unfair practices.89 While both parties benefit, it does not establish a privacy law
foundation, based on case law nor establish precedent for future actions.90
Instead, the FTC develops its power by relying on past settlements and practices
to enforce its authority and to ensure that companies cease unfair and deceptive
practices.91 Companies have responded by developing their own state-of-the-art
privacy practices beyond the scope of the FTC’s requirements and more closely
See infra Sub-subsections I(A)(1), (2).
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586-88 (2014) (analyzing the FTC as a common law
because it acts as the primary regulatory system for privacy within the United States); see
also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3rd Cir. 2015) (explaining that
FTC may deem a practice unfair without needing to support finding with privacy common
law when the practice causes substantial injury to customers).
87 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 600-04 (describing that as more regulatory
schemes develop within various industries, the FTC receives additional authority to ensure
that companies continue to operate under these principles in addition to the baseline
protections already set by the FTC).
88 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53.
89 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 604-64 (describing perhaps the biggest reason
why companies seek to avoid court and to abide by the FTC is because Congressional action
may occur if the FTC proves to be inadequate.); see also Shulamit Shvartsman, To Settle or
Not to Settle? That Is the Question, LAWYERS.COM, http://research.lawyers.com/to-settle-ornot-to-settle-that-is-the-question.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (explaining companies do
not like to go to court because of high costs, bad publicity, wasted time, and the possibility
for an admission of guilt).
90 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 588-89; Christina Ma, Into the Amazon: Clarity
and Transparency in FTC Section 5 Merger Doctrine, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953, 954
(2013).
91 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 588-89 (illustrating that critics argue that the
FTC has acted beyond its intended scope, resulting in a disposal of due process and legal
constraints); see also Now in Its 100th year, the FTC Has Become the Federal Technology
Commission, TECHFREEDOM (Sept. 26, 2013), http://techfreedom.org/now-in-its-100thyear-the-ftc-has-become-the/ (showing that coupled with a lack of rulemaking authority, the
FTC’s lack of binding precedent creates a regulatory regime based on discretionary
exercises of power unbound by legal principles).
85
86
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aligned to stricter global standards.92 Companies anticipate future FTC actions
and regulations, resulting in increased consumer-oriented protections, as
opposed to compliance-oriented procedures.93 In the United States, industries
have embraced this self-regulating system because it does not mandate the
stringent privacy standards found in data laws of the European Union and across
the globe.94
2. FTC as an Ambassador
While the FTC is the main privacy power in the United States, Section 45 of
the FTC Act restrains the FTC from expanding its jurisdiction to direct actions
against international organizations, absent extreme circumstances.95 According
to the FTC Act, unfair or deceptive practices involving foreign commerce must
rise to the level that they “cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable
injury within the United States,”96 or must “involve material conduct occurring
within the United States.”97 If international jurisdiction is found, the FTC can
use any available remedy for unfair or deceptive acts, including restitution to
relieve victims both domestic and abroad.98
The FTC also serves as an ambassador to discuss data privacy law with
foreign nations.99 In this capacity, the FTC is able to resolve disagreements
between foreign leaders over privacy standard issues and sign memoranda of
understanding to memorialize those agreements.100 These memoranda of
92 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 269-70 (2011) (stating how companies have become
increasingly proactive in ensuring international privacy compliance by adopting European
standards, which provide for the highest level of consumer data protection); see, e.g.,
Amazon Privacy Notice,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468496 (last updated
Aug. 29, 2017) (outlining Amazon’s robust privacy policy, including the corporation’s
participation in “EU-US and Swiss-US Privacy Shield frameworks”).
93 See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 92, at 273.
94 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 593-94.
95 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 821 (explaining that the FTC can expand its jurisdiction
into the international context only when needed to “prevent unfair methods of competition
involving commerce with foreign nations unless the competition has a direct, substantial
effect on U.S. commerce.” The FTC can investigate and report to Congress on business
conducts and foreign trade conditions that affect United States’ commerce, but the FTC
cannot take significant action against these foreign entities unless there are direct,
substantial effects on commerce); see also Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41, 45(a), 46 (establishing the FTC, outlining the prohibition on various unfair
business practices and granting the Commission regulatory authority).
96 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A)(i).
97 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A)(ii).
98 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(B).
99 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 280.
100 Id. at 280-81.
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understanding are made between the FTC, as a representative of the United
States, and a foreign nation’s governing privacy body, to recognize and reconcile
privacy law differences.101 Because the United States’ view on privacy is in
sharp contrast to that of its largest trade partner, the European Union, these
memoranda are essential in dealing with European Union Member States.102 For
example, unlike the European Union, the United States does not place significant
governmental restrictions in the international transfer of data.103 In response, the
FTC assumes the role of ensuring that companies under its jurisdiction comply
with more stringent global standards.104
Safe Harbor violations in particular have been a top priority for international
policy actions.105 The FTC will continue to serve this role under the Privacy
Shield.106 Though the FTC has evolved into a broad privacy protection
regulatory agency, it alone is insufficient to ensure the vitality of data transfers
between the United States and the European Union.107
101 Id. at 281 (describing that these memoranda are “designed to promote increased
cooperation and communication in both agencies’ efforts to protect consumer privacy.” The
FTC has signed multiple memoranda of understanding including one with Ireland’s Office
of the Data Protection Commission in June 2013, and with the UK Information
Commissioner’s Office in March 2014. Without such memoranda, certain nations are
unwilling to participate in data transfers because they are hesitant of any nation’s privacy
protections that are not “adequate” in the eyes of the European Union).
102 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Federal Trade
Commission and the Information Commissioner’s Office of the United Kingdom on Mutual
Assistance in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Personal Information in the Private
Sector, U.K.-U.S., Mar. 6, 2014, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/international-competition-consumerprotection-cooperation-agreements/140306ftc-uk-mou.pdf (agreeing to enforce across
borders, due to the “increase in the flow of personal information across borders [and] the
increasing complexity and pervasiveness of information technologies.”).
103 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 280.
104 Id. at 280-81 (explaining that the FTC has an Office of International Affairs, which
“works with competition and consumer protection agencies around the world to promote
cooperation and convergence toward best practices.”); see also Randolph W. Tritell, Office
of International Affairs, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/office-international-affairs (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
105 See, e.g., Thirteen Companies Agree to Settle FTC Charges They Falsely Claimed to
Comply with International Safe Harbor Framework, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/08/thirteen-companies-agree-settleftc-charges-they-falsely-claimed.
106 See Privacy Shield, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/privacy-and-security/privacy-shield (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) (stating, “[the] FTC
has committed to make enforcement of the [Privacy Shield] Framework a high priority”).
107 See generally Brookman, supra note 11; see also Julian Hattem, Rep. Issa takes aim
at FTC ‘inquisitions,’ THE HILL (July 24, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://originnyi.thehill.com/policy/technology/213242-issa-takes-aim-at-ftc-inquisitions (accusing the
FTC of overstepping its boundaries in pursuing companies for privacy violations because,
absent notice about the precise way a company should secure data, there is no way for
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B. State Privacy Laws
Federal privacy laws address certain industries; however, the majority of
consumer privacy protection laws are individualized at the state level, with
California setting the standard.108 Many states have begun to incorporate privacy
as a core right by amending their state constitutions to enumerate individual
rights to privacy.109 States have also responded to the increased demands for
privacy by enacting data breach laws that require notification to consumers in
the event of data security breaches involving personal information.110 Minnesota
and Nevada have even gone so far as to protect consumer personal information
by barring internet service providers from knowingly disclosing PII to third
parties.111 Even without privacy statutes, state attorneys general retain similar
powers from the FTC to prohibit unfair or deceptive trade practices.112
Increasingly, states have begun to embed a fundamental right to privacy within
their legislation, including how such rights should be protected.113 However,
businesses to tell if they are abiding by their stated security procedures).
108 CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2008); Jolly, supra note 40 (explaining that California was
the first state to enact a data breach notification law, which generally requires that “any
person or business that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal
information to disclose any breach of the security of the system to all California residents
whose unencrypted personal information was acquired by an unauthorized person.”).
109 E.g., Ariz. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1911) (“No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); see also 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-128.1 (2018) (“It is the policy of this state that every person in this state shall have a right to
privacy…”); see also Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NCSL (May 5, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacyprotections-in-state-constitutions.aspx (including a list of the ten states that have
incorporated the right to privacy into their state constitutions and these provisions).
110 Jolly, supra note 40 (“As of April 2016, 47 states, as well as the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands all have enacted laws requiring notification of
security breaches involving personal information.”); Stephen Embry, State data breach
notification laws just got crazier, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/may-2016/state-data-breachnotification-laws-just-got-crazier.html (discussing how many state data breach notification
laws are confusing, contradictory, and difficult to comply with for companies operating
under multiple state data breach notification laws).
111 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325M.02 (2003) (“Except as provided in sections 325M.03 and
325M.04, an Internet service provider may not knowingly disclose personally identifiable
information concerning a consumer of the Internet service provider.”); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 205.498 (1999) (providing when an Internet service provider shall keep consumer
personal information confidential).
112 Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair
or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV.
209, 212 (2016); THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 285.
113 Petrina McDaniel & Keshia Lipscomb, Data Breach Laws on the Books in Every
State; Federal Data Breach Law Hangs in the Balance, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Apr. 30,
2018), https://www.securityprivacybytes.com/2018/04/data-breach-laws-on-the-books-inevery-state-federal-data-breach-law-hangs-in-the-balance (discussing how all 50 states have
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state privacy laws are narrow in scale and do not adequately establish standards
for data protection, collection, monitoring, or use.114 Though states have begun
to emphasize and enforce data privacy, this process is too slow and sporadic to
create a legal scheme in the United States that can adequately comply with rising
international standards.115
C. Why the United States’ System is Unsustainable and Ineffective
Critics of the United States’ privacy law regime believe that the reactive,
patchwork system is unsustainable in a world where technology and privacy
concerns are continuously developing.116 Through the FTC, the United States
has pursued privacy protection as an unfair or deceptive practice rather than as
a separate area of concern.117 Under this method, companies are able to avoid
privacy concerns by not following the voluntary best practices.118 New
businesses are able to circumvent federal regulatory and FTC provisions under
the United States privacy model.119 This situation becomes a cost-benefit
analysis for companies where they must determine whether the potential loss on
laws and some worry a federal law may interfere with the States if not structured
effectively).
114 Cory Bennett, Lawmakers see momentum for data breach legislation, THE HILL (Jan.
27, 2015, 12:34 PM.), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/230867-data-breach-bill-isachievable-goal (indicating that while states have begun to dabble in creating data privacy
and protection rights, the inherent nature of data to freely flow throughout the world calls
for a greater encompassing approach to its governance).
115 Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approachdata-protection.
116 Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Reconciling Personal Information in the
United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 897-900 (2014); O’Connor,
supra note 115.
117 Brookman, supra note 11, at 358-59; see also Hattem, supra note 107 (discussing
how critics argue that the “unfair and deceptive practices” authority is overly broad and
should not address privacy matters because there is no substantive standard practice to
follow that provides guidance on whether or not companies are properly securing data).
118 Brookman, supra note 11, at 359 (illustrating that “it would be challenging to argue
that failure to provide access and correction rights constitutes a deceptive practice (as no
deception occurs) or that failure to offer users control of their data is unfair (as no
substantial harm is likely to occur), and consumers could avoid any potential harm by
merely not using the service.” Under this scheme, you can only be accountable if you decide
that it is worth providing for consumer data protections rather than simply disregarding the
subject).
119 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978 (stating the United States’ system for regulating
information privacy allows companies the freedom to innovate new data processing,
storage, and mining techniques. Though this can have positive effects on technological
development, it can also allow businesses to niche themselves into regulatory gaps to “test
new innovative practices or find new ways to violate privacy.”).
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consumer trust outweighs the potential costs from implementing, complying
with, and reconciling for violations of self-mandated privacy promises.120 On an
international basis, the FTC’s limited jurisdiction weakens its international
presence and authority.121 While the FTC has sufficed so far, the evolving
technological and global landscape outpaces the FTC’s ability to remain
effective as the United States’ primary privacy law enforcer.122
Critics of the state privacy law system in the U.S. argue that this reactive
approach causes inconsistencies, thus resulting in information remaining
unprotected.123 For companies this creates a potential for liability; if companies
operate on a national or international scale, staying in compliance with
individual jurisdiction requires monumental efforts.124 Without these barriers to
international transfers, companies would be able to rapidly expand into
international markets, which could stimulate economic spending and job
growth.125 Instead, the potential risks and associated costs adversely impact the
growth of trade amongst nations because companies, in their cost-benefit
analyses, cannot conclude that the most efficient allocation of wealth is worth
the price of trade.126
On the other hand, proponents of the United States’ approach to privacy
counter that this individualized structure promotes cooperation in the pursuit of
companies that fail to sufficiently protect individuals’ rights to privacy.127 Even
120 Morey et al., supra note 7 (illustrating that consumer trust, particularly through
transparency of business practices has become increasingly important to consumers’ buying
behaviors. Especially now that technological innovations have catalyzed data transfer and
collection, business must invest more heavily in compliance and data security or risk losing
the trust of their consumers).
121 Schwartz, supra note 21, at1977-78 (observing that the United States lacks a
commission to oversee international data transfers, which allows for limitless exportation of
individual data by companies to third countries. The FTC attempts to fill this role by
monitoring international data sharing, however, can only do so under its unfair and
deceptive practices authority and not as a limiting agency).
122 Id. at 1978-79; see also Marc Rotenberg, In support of a data protection board in the
United States, 8 GOV’T INFO. Q. 79-94 (1991) (positing a proposal to create a federal privacy
agency in the United States to better allow the United States to respond to the rapidly
changing, global data privacy landscape).
123 Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy Law,
TEACH PRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoral-approachprivacy-law.
124 COBB, supra note 44, at 8-9 (discussing an example of how a lack of consistency in
law has affected the legality of Stingrays, a data technology used by United States law
enforcement agencies. Further contemplates whether the government can use this
technology to conduct pre-emptive surveillance on suspected terrorists).
125 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-44 (1960) (advancing
the theory that, absent transaction costs, those operating within the economy will always
pursue the course of action most effective in allocating wealth).
126 Id.
127 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 285 (describing the benefits of having state privacy
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if increased cooperation exists, critics contend that state laws will remain
ineffective because they often conflict with one another or, at times, are subject
to federal law preemption.128 Furthermore, state laws are subject to
constitutional challenges, which have invalidated state privacy laws.129 Despite
speculation regarding the ineffectiveness of the approach adopted by the United
States, it has not taken any progressive steps toward an omnibus approach to
privacy, as most countries have done.130
In the United States, courts have been reluctant to grant relief for petitioners
by claiming a breach of privacy.131 Often, courts dismiss data breach claims due
to a lack of standing based on insufficient evidence of direct or actual harm.132
As Stephen Cobb, an advocate for universal privacy rights argues, “commercial
data controllers culpable in breach can argue that there is no harm to the subject
whose records have been exposed, unless they suffer a financial loss directly

laws as opposed to overarching federal laws – it requires “increased cooperation and
coordination in enforcement” between the FTC and state Attorneys General, which
strengthens FTC actions against unfair and deceptive practices).
128 Jolly, supra note 40 (contending that federal government and state governments often
conflict with one another regarding privacy law, where one sets higher standards than the
other, making it difficult for companies to know which laws to comply with. For example,
while federal law regarding the regulation of commercial e-mails preempts many state laws
on the same topic, state laws are the standard to follow with privacy concerning medical or
health records).
129 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1976-77 (expressing that data processors have
successfully challenged state information privacy laws because the sharing of information is
a constitutionally protected right of the freedom of expression); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659-60 (2011) (invalidating a Vermont law that stopped “detailers” from
selling, disclosing, and using pharmaceutical records for identification of doctors to target
market specific pharmaceuticals).
130 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53 (explaining omnibus approaches can create
expansive catch-all provisions that provide general privacy guidelines to address any
regulatory areas or issues not previously accounted for. Though countries adopting an
omnibus approach still use sectoral privacy provisions, their presence is to supplement a
standard minimum based on the requirements of a certain industry); see also Brookman,
supra note 11, at 367-68 (portraying Congress’ primary efforts towards promoting federal
privacy legislation as focusing on data breach notification, however, forty-seven states
already address this concern); see also Data protection across the world, MEDIUM (Jan. 30,
2018), https://medium.com/@privacyint/data-protection-across-the-world-fe66ca1e138f
(discussing the approaches toward data privacy that Argentina, China, and India have
taken).
131 COBB, supra note 44, at 7-8; In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape
Data Theft Litig., 45 F.Supp.3d 14, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2014) (stating increased risk of injury is
not enough to confer standing and grant relief).
132 Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F.Supp.3d 524, 534 (D. Md. 2016)
(explaining how the plaintiff did not “allege an injury in fact as required to establish Article
III standing” given the complaint did not allege an actual misuse of personal data, and thus
the district court dismissed the claim due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

2018]

The Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law

97

attributable to the breach.”133 For example, standing is hard to establish in data
breach cases without evidence of pecuniary loss, but it is even harder to prevail
when standing is granted based on alleged future harm.134 Standing in data
breach claims rests upon three theories: “(a) existing financial injuries[;] (b)
actual misuse of information that may fall short of specific financial injuries[;]
and (c) the alleged near-term risk of the misuse of information.”135 The first two
theories, actual financial harm and actual misuse of information, are sufficient
to establish standing.136 However, the majority of data breach cases rely upon
speculative future harm, absent evidence of pecuniary losses.137 To assess
standing for speculative harm, U.S. courts have looked at the underlying
circumstances of the breach and the length of time passed since the breach
occurred without incident.138 While United States’ courts are reluctant to grant
standing based upon allegations of possible risk of future harms, foreign courts
are beginning to recognize the severity of potential harm inherent in data
breaches.139
In the United States, companies can get privacy and data breach claims
dismissed based on assertions of a lack of standing due to no injury.140 However,
at an international level, courts are transitioning toward allowing standing in tort
privacy claims without showing of pecuniary harm.141 For example, between

133 COBB, supra note 44, at 7-8 (noting that other countries, such as Canada, have begun
to apply the tort cause of action “intrusion upon seclusion” to data breach cases).
134 See, e.g. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000) (stating that plaintiffs must establish standing through a showing that “(1) it has
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”); COBB, supra note 44, at 7-8 (stating absent an actual
pecuniary loss, courts have been hesitant to agree that an “injury in fact” has occurred and
that it is imminent to occur based on the dissemination of data).
135 Robert D. Fram et al., Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2015/09/standing_in_data_breach_cases.pdf.
136 Id.
137 Id. (stating, “the most commonly alleged injury . . . is an increased risk of future
identity theft.”).
138 Id. (stating that the courts evaluate factors such as the likelihood of actual harm and
the length of time between the data breach and litigation); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp.
Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.Supp.3d at 20-21 (stating, “an attenuated chain of
possibilities does not confer standing”).
139 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1156-60 (2013) (holding
that plaintiffs did not establish standing because there was no threatened imminent injury or
concretely traceable injury resulting from the implementation of Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978).
140 Fram et al., supra note 135 (stating that courts usually agree with companies moving
to dismiss because an increased risk from a breach is insufficient for standing).
141 Lisa R. Lifshitz, A New Tort Is Born! Ontario Recognizes its First Privacy Tort, BUS.
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2011 and 2012, allegations arose that Google circumvented consumer Safari
privacy settings to allow for the installation of data tracking cookies.142 Then,
Google sold the data collected from the cookies to third-party companies to use
in direct marketing campaigns towards individual consumers.143 While Google
obtained settlements in the United States,144 on June 12, 2013, the United
Kingdom’s Master of the Rolls permitted three claimants, domiciled in England,
to serve Google at its principal place of business in Mountain View,
California.145 On January 16, 2014, the High Court of Justice in Strand, London
ruled that the claims for tortious misuse of private information and breach of the
Data Protection Act of 1998 were triable issues and that jurisdiction was
proper.146 Coupled with a willingness to apply long arm statutes to allow
international citizens to serve United States based companies, more of these

L. TODAY (Mar. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2012/
03/keeping-current-new-tort-born-201203.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing how Ontario
recently recognized that privacy torts for data breaches exist); Halley v. McCann, 2016
CanLII 58945 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.) (awarding damages for a breach of privacy claim and
acknowledging that invasion of privacy torts in Ontario do not require proof of pecuniary
loss or any sort of economic harm); Jones v. Tsige, (2012) 108 O.R. (3d) 241 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
142 Doug Drinkwater, Google-Vidal Hall “opens the floodgates” to data breach
compensation, SC MAG. UK (May 15, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/google-vidalhall-opens-the-floodgates-to-data-breach-compensation/article/414910.
143 Id.; see generally Duhigg, supra note 6 (explaining how companies conduct target
marketing and the types of consumer information used to develop predictive targeting of
advertisement).
144 Omer Tene, The European Privacy Judicial Decision of a Decade: Google v. VidalHall, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Apr. 2, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-europeanprivacy-judicial-decision-of-a-decade-google-v-vidal-hall (stating “Google settled with the
Federal Trade Commission and state attorney general in the U.S. for more than $22 million
and $17 million respectively.”); THE PRIVACY, supra note 61 (explaining when the Google
Safari cookie scandal occurred, Google settled with 37 states for $17 million); A.G.
Schneiderman Announces $17 Million Multistate Settlement with Google Over Tracking of
Consumers, N.Y. ST. ATT’Y GEN. (Nov. 18, 2013) (on file with author),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-17-million-multistatesettlement-google-over-tracking (explaining that Google entered into a $17 million
multistate settlement agreement “concerning its unauthorized placement of cookies on
computers using Apple Safari Web browsers during 2011 and 2012”).
145 Vidal-Hall v. Google [2015] EWCA (Civ) 311, [6], (Eng.); Greg Palmer, UK –
Google v Vidal-Hall: A green light for compensation claims?, LINKLATERS (June 15, 2015),
https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/publications/tmt-news/tmt-news—-june-2015/uk—google-v-vidal-hall-a-green-light-for-compensation-claims (concluding that claimants
received permission to serve Google, Inc. under the United Kingdom’s long arm statute on
the grounds that Google had committed the tort of misuse of private information, with the
damages occurring within the United Kingdom and for breach of provisions in the Data
Protection Act 1988); see also Principal Place of Business, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
(10th ed. 2009).
146 Vidal-Hall v. Google [2014] EWHC (QB) 13; Drinkwater, supra note 142.
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types of actions will arise as international standards continue to develop.147
United States data privacy law is a sectoral scheme that reacts to egregious
changes in public policy and on a case-by-case basis.148 The FTC is the United
States’ primary regulatory body for data protection and privacy; however, the
FTC was not founded with the intention of occupying this field of law.149
Because the FTC’s authority relies upon its unfair-and-deceptive-practices
power under Section 45 of the FTC Act, the FTC’s power only extends to the
poor practices of individual companies.150 While there have been proposals to
Congress that would create a federal data privacy statute or data protection
board, none have yet to pass through both the Senate and the House.151 Overall,
the United States’ approach to data privacy law is in stark contrast with the
European Union, therefore Congress must reconcile these differences to avoid
greater future consequences.152
II. DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Unlike in the United States, the European Union embraces a fundamental
right of privacy for citizens, both online and offline.153 While the United States
views data protection as the broad concept of general privacy, the European
Union narrows its view to specifically protect citizen rights from “the collection
and processing of personal data.”154 Unlike the American system for privacy
protection, the European Union proactively seeks to strengthen privacy
protection—both internally and externally, when dealing with non-European
147 Lifshitz, supra note 141, at 2 (discussing how Ontario recently recognized that
privacy torts for data breaches exist among companies that do business in Canada).
148 Cameron F. Kerry, Filling the Gaps in US Data Privacy Laws, BROOKINGS INST.
(July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/12/filling-the-gaps-in-us-data-privacy-laws.
149 Serwin, supra note 48, at 811.
150 THE PRIVACY, supra note 61, at 275.
151 Boggs & Donoghue, supra note 58; see, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act
of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); Data Security Act of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
152 See infra Part III.
153 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, Oct. 26, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 393, 397 (explaining Article 7 concerns the right to respect for private and
family life where “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life,
home and communications.”. Article 8 concerns the protection of personal data where
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”).
154 Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 461, 470 (2000) (stating the United States uses the term “privacy” to address a wide
range of issues, ranging from the right to an abortion, the lack of security cameras within a
dressing room, to voter confidentiality. This disparity between views is why Americans are
less concerned with data protection security: they think of privacy as an overarching,
general concept rather than as a singular issue).
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Union countries.155 European Union consumers are also given greater power in
limiting what data they expose to the world with a “right to be forgotten.”156 The
European Union’s proactive approach towards personal privacy protection has
made it the global leader in privacy law and data security.157
A. The Data Protection Directive
On October 24, 1995, the European Parliament adopted the Data Protection
Directive (DPD) 95/46/EC, the European Union’s primary source for data
protection law, “to ensure that the level of protection of the rights and freedoms
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is equivalent in all
Member States.”158 The DPD also extends beyond Member State borders by
providing data protection adequacy requirements to companies located in third
world countries.159 Under the DPD, Member States have the ability to impose

155 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 29, at 118 (exploring the differences in data protection
between the European Union and the United States where the former takes a broad,
proactive approach and the latter is reactive to specific crises).
156 David Streitfeld, European Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/technology/google-should-erase-weblinks-to-some-personal-data-europes-highest-court-says.html?_r=0 (explaining the decision
of the European Union to allow consumers to have the right to make search engines erase
certain links to webpages upends traditional notions of free flows of information); see also
Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 161, 169-72 (2012) (finding in the United States, First Amendment
issues arise grounded on the belief of a contradiction to the fundamental protections for
freedom of speech and press).
157 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1974-79 (explaining how the E.U. has embraced an
“Omnibus” approach to privacy laws that sets a minimum standard for privacy protection
amongst its Member States with incentives for states to both incorporate, and strengthen, its
concepts. This omnibus method has shaped future privacy laws for nations a part of, and
external to, the European Union).
158 S.T.S., Nov. 24, 2011 (Spain), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0468&from=EN (defining personal data as
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”); O.E.C.D., Recommendation
of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, (as amended on July 10, 1980),
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/114 (describing how the Directive enforces
a minimum standard on privacy protection laws within the European Union, based upon the
1980 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Recommendations
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD
Guidelines), which set forth recommended, non-binding privacy principles for countries to
abide by).
159 Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1972-73.
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stricter privacy protection standards than what the DPD requires.160 The DPD
requires that the processing of personal data occur only when:
[T]he data subject has unambiguously given his/her consent; processing
is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject
is a party, for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller
is subject, to protect the vital interests of the data subject, or it is in the
public interest.161
By providing minimum standards for data processing across its Member States,
the European Union ensures that it protects its citizens’ fundamental right to
privacy.162 This protection is enforceable both within the European Union and
against third-party countries participating in international data transfers.163
Prior to the adoption of the DPD, the structure of the European Union’s
system for privacy protection resembled that of the United States.164 In contrast,
while the United States remained content with this approach to data privacy, the
European Union sought to set a standard minimum level of protection amongst
all of its Member States.165 Even though the majority of the countries previously
had broad data protection laws, the European Union used the DPD to ensure that

160 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 5, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=En (explaining that individual
member states must adhere to the minimum levels of privacy protection standards set forth
in the DPD, however, states have the authority to “determine more precisely the conditions
under which the processing of personal data is lawful.”).
161 Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the Subcomm. on
Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 21 (2015)
(statement of Dr. Joshua P. Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
program at the Brookings Institute); 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 6, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=En (stating
that data processors must prove the quality of any personal data processed, where it must be:
“(a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. . .; (c)
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected
and/or further processed; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date . . .; (e) kept in a
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the
purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed”).
162 See Fromholz, supra note 154, at 468-69.
163 See id. at 468 n.40.
164 See id. at 468.
165 See id. (explaining the European Commission headed this effort by directing member
countries to make data protection a fundamental right, to create independent supervisory
bodies, to establish redress for enforcement, and to ensure that international data transfers
complied with these high standards); Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
at art. 25 & 26 (setting out adequacy standards, and exemptions, under Articles 25 and 26,
respectively).
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its Member States protected its citizens’ fundamental rights to privacy.166 By
setting the minimum standard, while leaving certain powers to the Member
States, the European Union has allowed for easier data flow throughout Europe
and with non-member countries.167 Even if third party countries do not meet the
European Union’s stringent adequacy standards, like the United States,
exceptions are made as long as one of a list of certain conditions is met.168
However, the European Union’s data protection laws are rapidly evolving in
ways that affect both Member States and non-Member States alike.169 While the
DPD has been successful in protecting its citizen data privacy, it has only been
a directive.170 The European Union passed, on the approval of all of its members,
a uniform regulatory regime to ensure that one system of data protection law
governs the entire European Union.171 This legislation comes in the form of the

166 See Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the
Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431, 433 (1995) (illustrating that most countries in Europe
had statutes broadly protecting data within the public and private sectors); Council Directive
95/46 art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42 (EC) (stating the establishment of a standard minimum
for protection still allows individual countries to enact legislation defining their means for
monitoring and enforcing data protection).
167 See Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An
Examination of Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the United States, 29
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109, 118-19 (1997) (enacting the Directive has increased and
expedited data transfers amongst member states because each must adhere to, at least,
minimum standards. Even if the data transfers from one Member State to another, then to a
non-Member State, the Directive protects the original country’s data privacy interest
because the second Member State must adhere to the Directive’s minimum adequacy
standards).
168 See Council Directive 95/46 art. 25-26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 45-46 (EC) (illustrating
exceptions to adequacy include unambiguous consent; necessity for the performance or
execution of a contract with the data subject; performance of a contract with a third-party in
the data subject’s interest; necessity for the public interest or in furtherance of a legal claim;
protection of vital interests of the data subject; and, lawful transfers made from a public
register).
169 See Warwick Ashford, EU Data Protection Rules Affect Everyone, Say Legal
Experts, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:00 PM),
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/4500270456/EU-data-protection-rules-affecteveryone-say-legal-experts; see Shan Wang, Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation
is Coming May 25. How Have News Publishers Prepared?, NEIMAN LAB (May 3, 2018),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/05/europes-general-data-protection-regulation-is-comingmay-25-how-have-news-publishers-prepared/.
170 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 902 (describing that the directive grants
rights rather than obligating specific actions to facilitate a minimum end result rather than a
comprehensive set of steps towards such goal. As a directive, the DPD faced limitations of
only having the authority to set minimum data protection standards for Member States
rather than as a uniform standard of regulation); see Bowman, supra note 11 (stating that
while this allowed for easier trade across the European Union, member states implemented
privacy laws at varying degrees of stringency, making trade sometimes difficult).
171 See Bowman, supra note 11; Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 32 (EC).
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General Rules of Data Protection (GDPR), which replaced the DPD on May 25,
2018.172 Through the GDPR, E.U. privacy law and global privacy law standards
will dramatically increase at a rate that the United States’ current regulatory
scheme cannot keep pace with.173
B. Evolving Global Data Privacy through the General Data Protection
Regulation
On May 25, 2018, the GDPR replaced the DPD as the European Union’s data
protection framework.174 The GDPR came in response to the changing
technological environment where electronic data transfers have become more
prevalent and further reaching.175 The GDPR aims to strengthen the effects of
the DPD by creating a uniform and enforceable data protection scheme.176
Though certain similarities between the GDPR and DPD exist, the GDPR
contains a broader territorial scope, the enumeration of stronger rights of control
for data subjects, and higher penalties for company violations.177 Additionally,
while the scope of the DPD only allowed Member States to govern controllers
and processors within their borders, the GDPR applies to three broad situations:
(1) when an organization physically operates anywhere within the European
Union; (2) when the data processed concerns an individual within the European
Union; and (3) where the national law of an individual Member State is applied
to benefit public international law.178 With greater concerns for privacy
protection in a continuously evolving technological environment, the European
172 See Ashford, supra note 169 (explaining that the GDPR will have significant impacts
on companies operating within, and out of, the European Union if operations involve the
personal data of E.U. citizens. Stewart Room, cyber security and data protection partner at
Pricewaterhouse Cooper stated his belief that the GDPR “will impact every entity that holds
or uses European personal data both inside and outside of Europe.”).
173 Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294-300 (discussing how the FTC has only
scratched the surface of its power to regulate U.S. data privacy and how it is presently
unable to keep pace with the rising global standards; however, authors take a different
approach in rectifying this current situation); cf. De Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note
173, at 315-23 (advocating for an international data privacy organization to reconcile
differences amongst countries in their data privacy and protection policies).
174 See The EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 174, at 2.
175 See Bowman, supra note 11 (explaining that since the DPD’s passage twenty years
ago, technological innovations and the way that society has interacted through technology
has changed tremendously. Social media, phone apps, and increased spread and function of
the Internet have all contributed to greater degrees of data transfer).
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See Gonzago Gallego et al., FUTURE-PROOFING PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PREPARING FOR
THE EU DATA PROTECTION REGULATION, (2016); Robert Madge, GDPR’s Global Scope: The
Long Story, MEDIUM (May 12, 2018), https://medium.com/mydata/does-the-gdpr-apply-inthe-us-c670702faf7f.
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Union is setting the global standard for individual privacy protection.179
The GDPR defines its territorial scope in Article Three to include all relevant
controllers or processors of E.U. citizens’ personal data, regardless of whether
they physically operate within the European Union.180 Chapter V, Articles 44
through 49,181 of the GDPR, govern the cross-border transfers of E.U. citizens’
data, and are primarily predicated on a certification of the adequacy standard.182
Under Article 45 of the GDPR, adequacy decisions reaffirmed the ability to
conduct data transfers when a third party can ensure that its country’s data
security standards are sufficient to comply with those in the European Union.183
Adequacy determinations of a country allows for the simplest process for data
transfers because it requires no additional safeguards to be implemented by a
business and no additional authorization requirements.184 However, the
adequacy decision remains subject to periodic review by the European
Commission.185 In certain circumstances, Article 46 of the GDPR allows for
cross border data transfers, absent an adequacy decision, with the presence of

179 See Gallego et al., supra note 178 (explaining how Article 3 of the GDPR creates a
global standard for privacy protection law because it encompasses “any company that
markets good or services to EU residents . . . regardless of whether the company is located
or uses equipment in the EU or not”); O’Connor, supra note 115.
180 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 5 (EU) (illustrating that any
processing of consumer data related to the offering of goods or services to data subjects,
regardless of payment occurs, and to the monitoring of data subject behavior within the
European Union).
181 Id. at art. 45-49 (emphasizing that Article 45 specifies terms for transfers predicated
on adequacy decisions. Article 46 states the conditions necessary for cross-border transfers,
absent an adequacy decision. Article 47 details conditions for transfers using binding
corporate rules as an adequacy mechanism. Article 48 addresses situations where foreign
governments and judiciaries order cross-border transfers unpermitted under the GDPR.
Article 49 lists the conditions for derogations, exceptions, to the GDPR’s prohibition on
cross-border data transfers, absent an adequacy decision or the use of approved safeguards).
182 See Dr. Detlev Gabel & Time Hickman, Chapter 13: Cross-Border Data TransfersUnlocking the EU General Data Protection Regulation, WHITE & CASE (Sep. 13, 2017),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-13-cross-border-data-transfersunlocking-eu-general-data-protection; Anna Myers, Top 10 Operational Impacts of the
GDPR: Part 4 – Cross-Border Data Transfers, IAPP (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-4-cross-border-datatransfers/.
183 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 45, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 61 (EU).
184 Ariel Teshuva, Why Has the EU Made So Few Adequacy Determinations?, LAWFARE
(Jan. 2, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-has-eu-made-so-few-adequacydeterminations.
185 See Myers, supra note 182 (discussing that the European Commission determines
adequacy based on the consideration of numerous factors, including but not limited to, “the
specific processing activities, access to justice, international human rights norms, the
general and sectoral law of the country, legislation concerning public security, defense and
national security, public order, and criminal law.”).

2018]

The Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law

105

appropriate safeguards.186 Article 49 of the GDPR lists appropriate situations for
safeguards and derogations.187
Data subjects receive greater rights to data privacy under the GDPR.188 Under
the DPD, use of safeguards and derogations required unambiguous consent by
data subjects through either a statement of affirmation or clear affirmative
action.189 The GDPR raises the standard for applying these derogations to
require explicit consent, either orally or in writing.190 The explicit consent
requirement must involve the signing of a separate request for consent by the
data subject, which grants their permission to have their personal information
stored and transmitted.191 This standard puts more power in the hands of
consumers to dictate what personal information is transmitted across borders.192
The GDPR also grants data subjects several additional rights, including but not
limited to: the right to restriction processing;193 the right to portability;194 and
the right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten.195
Unlike in the United States, the GDPR takes a strong stance to ensure that
companies, both internal and external to the European Union, comply with its
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 46, 2016 (EU).
Id. at art. 49 (listing appropriate situations allowing for the use of safeguards in the
absence of an adequacy decision including explicit consent upon knowledge of the risks,
necessity for contract performance either between the data subject and the controller or in
the data subject’s interest, strong public interest, and defense of legal claims).
188 See Myers, supra note 182.
189 Council Directive 95/46, art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
190 See Myers, supra note 182.
191 See id. (acknowledging the GDPR does not explicitly state whether consent is
necessary only initially or throughout the data management and transfer process. It is
recommended that companies provide adequate information in their consent requests
regarding potential data transfers, in addition to actively renewing consumer consent.); see
also Andrew Clearwater & Brian Philbrook, Practical tips for consent under the GDPR,
IAPP (Jan. 23, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/practical-tips-for-consent-under-the-gdpr/.
192 See The EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 174 (describing the
subject of explicit consent is controversial because it states that consumers must have rights
to withdraw consent as they see fit. In the context of e-commerce and contract performance,
explicit consent is likely to raise issues because consent is a non-negotiable condition on
obtaining a service with arguable freedom of choice).
193 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 18 & 21, 2016 (EU) (stating data subjects can
restrict controller data processing of their personal data when the subjects contest the data’s
accuracy, the process of the data is unlawful, the personal data is no longer necessary for
processing purposes, or if the data subject objects to the process of the data pursuant to
Article 21(1)).
194 Id. at art. 20 (explaining that data subjects, when the processing of data is machine
automated and based on either consent or contract, have the right to order a controller to
deliver the personal data concerning him or her in a “structured, commonly used and
machine-readable format.”).
195 Id. at art. 17(1)-(2) (demonstrating that data subjects have the right to require a
controller to erase personal data controlling him or her, without undue delay, when one of
several broad circumstances apply).
186
187
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high standards for citizen data protection.196 Data subjects covered by the GDPR
receive remedial rights, and mainly, the right to compensation for controller, or
processor violations that result in either material, or non-material, damages.197
For example, infringement of GDPR provisions, with regard to cross-border data
transfers, subjects the violating entity to “administrative fines up to 20,000,000
EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.”198 While on its
face 4% seems minimally intrusive, for multibillion dollar companies, this can
add up to hundreds of millions of dollars in violations and noncompliance.199
These remedial rights make the GDPR’s reach act as a quasi-global law, because
even the slight risk of violation for a medium or large sized company outweighs
the possible financial repercussions if an administrative fine is found to be
applicable.200 Now with the GDPR’s implementation and the remaining
compliance uncertainty, companies must change their practices now or face
enormous penalties later.201
The GDPR’s implementation has further increased the data privacy gap that
existed between the United States and the European Union.202 While the DPD
built the European Union’s foundation of privacy law, the GDPR attempts to
create a uniform standard amongst its Member States that transcends the E.U.’s
borders.203 The potential implications and ramifications that noncompliance
with GDPR standards may have on international dealings has raised red flags
See Bowman, supra note 11; Svantesson, supra note 30.
GDPR Training, HIPPA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/gdpr-training/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2018).
198 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 83(5), 2016 (EU) (explaining the GDPR
includes additional circumstances for administrative fines for violations of its provisions).
199 See Bowman, supra note 11; Bernard Marr, GDPR: The Biggest Data Breaches and
The Shocking Fines (That Would Have Been), FORBES (Jun. 11, 2018, 12:28 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/06/11/gdpr-the-biggest-data-breaches-andthe-shocking-fines-that-would-have-been/#719f62826c10.
200 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 83(2), 2016 (EU) (describing that a variety of
factors determine whether an infringement warrants an administrative fine and its severity.
Examples of determinative factors include the nature, gravity, and duration of the
infringement; the intentional or negligent character of the infringement; actions taken to
mitigate the damage; and the degree of controller or processor responsibility, to name a
few).
201 See Ashford, supra note 169 (illustrating that the GDPR’s scope goes beyond
effecting data processors but also those who provide services to them. All companies will
need to assess whether the GDPR affects them, either directly or indirectly, and, if so, how
to proactively prepare to comply).
202 See Bowman, supra note 11.
203 See Ashford, supra note 169; see generally Gilbert, supra note 27 (discussing how
the GDPR will affect companies worldwide involved in international commerce because its
protection transcends E.U. Member State borders by following the data trail of E.U.
citizens).
196
197
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among companies and government officials in the United States.204 Though it
may be costly upfront, the impetus for change will only increase costs and
liability if action is not soon taken by the United States.205 To reconcile its
privacy laws with more stringent global standards, the United States can no
longer rely on the negotiation of trade agreements, like the Privacy Shield, to
come to an arguable middle ground.206 The United States must take significant
preemptive steps toward raising its own standards.207
C. The GDPR’s Impact on U.S. Based Companies
Already, the impact of the GDPR has been felt by businesses operating
outside of the United States.208 On the first day of its implementation, Facebook,
Inc. and Google, Inc., both U.S. based companies, were sued for alleged
coercion of consumer consent to sharing their personal data.209 According to the
complaints, the companies did not allow users free choice to consent to the use
of their personal data because they were forced into accepting each respective

204 But see Paul Merrion, Survey Reveals Widespread Ignorance of Europe’s New
Privacy Regulation, 2016 WL 5955365 (Oct. 14, 2016) (presenting survey findings
regarding the lack of preparation and knowledge about the GDPR and its potential effects on
international data transfers. According to the surveys within this study, conducted by Dell
Software, “[a]bout 82 percent [of the 821 executives surveyed] said they are concerned
about GDPR but knew little or nothing about its details, and 97 percent said their companies
do not have a plan to come into compliance.”).
205 See Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data
Flows: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and the
Subcomm. on Commc’ns and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong.
21 (2015) (detailing figures about the transatlantic data economy between the European
Union and the United States); see also Paul Merrion, EU’s New Privacy Reg. Will Require
75,000 Data Protection Officers Worldwide, 2016 WL 6645854 (Nov. 10, 2016) (discussing
the findings of a study conducted by the International Association of Privacy Professionals,
which predicts that companies worldwide will need to hire at least 75,000 data protection
officers to ensure that organizations stay in compliance with the GDPR’s standards).
206 Weiss & Archick, supra note 16.
207 See infra Part III (discussing how privacy law in the United States is lagging behind
with the rest of the world, which may impact future trade if the United States does not
develop its data protection standards).
208 Chris Albers Denhart, New European Union Data Law GDPR Impacts Are Felt By
Largest Companies: Google, Facebook, FORBES (May 25, 2018, 10:27 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisdenhart/2018/05/25/new-european-union-data-law-gdprimpacts-are-felt-by-largest-companies-google-facebook/#46eb34ea4d36.
209 See Russell Brandon, Facebook and Google hit with $8.8 billion in lawsuits on day
one of GDPR, THE VERGE (May 25, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/25/17393766/facebook-google-gdpr-lawsuit-maxschrems-europe (alleging that the new policies written by the companies in anticipation of
the GDPR were insufficient to allow users a freedom of consent beyond an all-or-nothing
choice).
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company’s terms.210 Though both organizations had prepared for the GDPR’s
implementation, these suits indicate the lack of compliance and regulatory
backing in the United States that leaves companies susceptible to GDPR
violations. Facebook has received additional data security scrutiny for its failure
to comply with the GDPR following two data breach incidents.211 On September
25, 2018, Facebook experienced a data breach incident, which impacted 50
million accounts.212 Though less than five million of the users effected were
European citizens, the incident may still result in a fine up to $1.63 billion.213 In
a prior similar data breach incident, Facebook received only a £500,000 fine
under the DPD.214 While this occurrence affected 17 million European citizen
accounts, this fine was the maximum amount allowed under the now outdated
Data Protection Act.215 Had the amount been calculated under the GDPR’s
provisions, this fine would have been roughly $22 million, or 4% of Facebook’s
global turnover at the time.216 Though the GDPR’s impact on United States
companies has been minimal thus far, it has already reared its devastating
potential.
III. SOMETIMES, SLOW AND STEADY DOES NOT WIN THE RACE
The United States must alter its mindset towards data privacy if it wishes to
sustain its international data transfer market.217 While the slowly developing

Denhart, supra note 208.
Id.
212 See Charlie Osborne, Facebook could face $1.63bn fine under GDPR for latest data
breach, ZDNET (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-could-face-billionsin-fines-under-gdpr-over-latest-data-breach/.
213 See id. (stating that the GDPR’s fine calculations of the greater of either €20 million
or 4% of annual global turnover, applied to Facebook’s recent financial results, may tops out
at $1.63 billion).
214 See James Vincent, UK data watchdog fines Facebook maximum legal amount for
Cambridge Analytica scandal, THE VERGE (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/25/18021900/facebook-cambridge-analytica-scandaluk-data-watchdog-ico-fines-maximum-amount.
215 See id. (stating that even though the maximum fine was awarded, many believed that
this was insufficient).
216 See id.
217 See Bennett, supra note 156, at 192-94 (explaining the constant developments in
technology, business, and the Internet create a highly complex, changing legal landscape.
Though a method for solution may not be clear, inaction is not a viable option to reconciling
cultural differences and protecting either nation’s privacy interests); see also Erika Morphy,
Staring Down the Intersection of ePrivacy, GDPR and Privacy Shield, CMS WIRE (Aug. 29,
2018), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/staring-down-the-intersection-ofeprivacy-gdpr-and-privacy-shield/ (discussing aspects of data-sharing not addressed by
current regulations).
210
211
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sectoral approach to privacy appeases the expectations of United States citizens
and businesses, it is unsustainable in the long run.218 The United States’
approach is too slow to satisfy rapidly growing expectations at an international
level.219 At its core, the European Union’s emphasis on privacy is a fundamental
right and willingness to enforce its protection creates a much higher standard for
privacy protection.220 More countries are embracing this approach toward
protecting consumer data and privacy by following the European Union’s strict
approach.221 This rise of global standards complicates international data
transfers because the United States must either adopt a similar stricter approach
to privacy or rely on negotiated trade agreements similar to the Safe Harbor
Agreement and Privacy Shield.222 As evidenced by the Safe Harbor Agreement,
the United States cannot reasonably rely on the negotiation of dozens of
agreements to allow companies to safely participate in international data
transfers because the international data policies will not withstand legal
challenges.223 Instead, the United States must embrace an omnibus approach, at
the least, to govern all international data transferred into the United States and
used by American companies.224 Without a minimum standard in place,
218 See Brookman, supra note 11, at 371-74 (explaining the government is unlikely to
place any significant importance on protecting privacy until pressured by American citizens.
The difficulty in this is that while citizens can sense privacy concerns, they do not
understand the full extent to which personal data collection, storage, processing, and
transmitting occurs).
219 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 2007-08 (2013) (describing new developments and
stricter requirements will enlarge the privacy law gap between the European Union and the
United States. Unless the United States government and companies operating between the
European Union and the United States respond with increased privacy emphasizes, future
legal challenges are certain to loom).
220 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, art. 7 & 8, 2012
O.J. C 326/02; Fromholz, supra note 154; Streitfeld, supra note 156 (discussing the current
approach to privacy law in the European Union).
221 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978-79 (describing how the effects of more
countries following the European Union’s approach towards privacy makes the United
States’ privacy law lag further behind the regulations necessary to conduct in international
data trades); see also Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data Protection Rules
Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2018, 4:50 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-privacy-standards-gdpr-generalprotection-data-regulation/ (describing how countries such as Japan, Israel, and South Africa
recently conformed to data protection guidelines put forth by the European Union).
222 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978-79; see also Bennett, supra note 156, at 192-94
(describing the importance for Unites States companies to reconcile with the European
Union’s data privacy regulations).
223 See generally U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK DOCUMENTS,
https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019); see generally
Tourkochoriti, supra note 33, at 162 (discussing the impact that the disparity between data
privacy standards in the United States and the European Union has on international data
transfer relations and negotiations).
224 O’Connor, supra note 115; see Seita, supra note 35, at 472-73 (discussing the
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subsequent international agreements regarding international data transfers are
likely to fail.225
A. The United States Must Adopt an Omnibus Approach to Privacy
Companies and industries operating within the United States are reluctant to
give Congress a reason to enact overarching privacy regulations.226 Although
there have been numerous attempts to pass federal privacy regulations through
Congress, none have successfully passed through.227 The United States’ only
recent significant change in privacy law is the Judicial Redress Act, which
addresses international concern over data sharing in the context of criminal and
terrorism investigations.228 This has been the United States’ only major privacy

globalization of trade and how the United States should adopt a comprehensive data privacy
and protection regime, similar to the direction taken by that the majority of the world).
225 See Mehreen Khan & Jim Brunsden, EU to Demand Tough Data-Protection Rules
with Future Trade Deals, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e489abba0dc5-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09 (describing that as the EU’s regulatory guidelines expand
globally, the United States’ influence in international trade will diminish); see
Tourkochoriti, surpa note 33, at 161-62(discussing current negotiations between the
European Union and the United States on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP), which aims to increase foreign trade and investment between the U.S.
and the E.U.); see also Eric Shimp, Data Privacy in the Transatlantic Trade Agreement?
US-EU Ponder the Way Forward, ALSTON & BIRD: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. BLOG (Apr. 10,
2013), http://www.alstonprivacy.com/data-privacy-in-the-transatlantic-trade-agreement-useu-ponder-the-way-forward/ (discussing how data protection and privacy concerns have
impacted recent trade negotiations and how they are likely to continue to stall progress of
agreements between the United States and countries with greater data security standards).
226 Neema Singh Guilani & Jay Stanley, The Landmark European Law That Could
Change Facebook and Improve Privacy in America, ACLU (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/landmark-european-lawcould-change-facebook-and-improve; contra Cameron F. Kerry, Why protecting privacy is a
losing game today–and how to change the game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-andhow-to-change-the-game (stating that “a number of companies have been increasingly open
to discussion of a basic federal privacy law,” because they see “value in a common baseline
that can provide people reassurance about how their data is handled.”).
227 See Boggs & Donoghue, supra note 58; Ashley Baker, Congress must act to protect
privacy before courts make surveillance even easier, THE HILL (Aug. 7, 2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/345559-congress-must-act-to-protect-dataprivacy-before-courts-make.
228 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(1)(A)-(B), (D) (2014); Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-126, Feb. 24, 2016, 130 Stat 282 (2016); see also Eric Geller, Everything You Need to
Know about the Big New Data-Privacy Big in Congress, THE DAILY DOT (Feb. 4, 2016,
5:28 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-the-judicial-redress-act-europe-dataprivacy-bill/ (describing the significance of the Judicial Redress Act and its impact on the
European Union and the United States’ international data relations).
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law advancement since the Safe Harbor Agreement’s invalidation.229 Though
important to sustaining international data privacy relations, government uses of
personal data for criminal cases does not address the European Union’s concerns
for protecting individual’s data as a standard practice.230
The United States government must take further precautions to protect the
personal information of its own citizens; otherwise the European Union and
other third-party countries will take further precautions when conducting
international data transfers.231 The invalidation of the Safe Harbor Agreement
proves that the United States’ privacy laws governing consumer data are not on
par with the European Union.232 However, the United States’ domestic federal
privacy law landscape remains unchanged since the invalidation.233 With the rest
of the world adopting privacy approaches similar to the European Union, the
United States lags further behind.234 Agreements like the Privacy Shield, which
will attempt to bridge even larger privacy policy gaps than its predecessor, is set
up for failure from the outset, unless change occurs within the United States.235
Without the development of consumer data protections in the United States,
corporations will likely experience exponential increases in costs for

229 European Commission Press Release, Statement by Commissioner Věra Jourová on
the signature of the Judicial Redress Act by President Obama (Feb. 24, 2016).
230 See Weiss & Archick, supra note 16, at 13.
231 See Tourkochoriti, supra note 33, at 161 (indicating that while the United States is a
valuable trade partner because of its economy’s strength, countries are not willing to
compromise on their fundamental rights to privacy. Instead, more hurdles to trade
negotiations arise, prolonging the negotiation process); Nigel Cory, Cross-Border Data
Flows: Where Are the Barriers, and What Do They Cost?, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUND. (May 2017), http://www2.itif.org/2017-cross-border-dataflows.pdf?_ga=2.231190111.1146412004.1535386038-1536309635.1535386038.
232 See European Court of Justice Invalidates U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement, supra
note 26, at 1-2 (discussing the impact and reasoning behind the invalidation of the Safe
Harbor Agreement).
233 Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (2016); Amy C.
Pimentel, Safe Harbor update: House votes to pass Judicial Redress Act, LEXOLOGY (Oct.
22, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=89cf6033-8252-4e78-85d6a93acc97a65e (describing the Judicial Redress Act as a means of redressing the invalidation
of the Safe Harbor Agreement).
234 See Gallego et al., supra note 178, at 57 (describing the territorial scope of the GDPR
and its bolstering effect on international data privacy standards); Business Without Borders:
The Importance of Cross-Border Data Transfers of Global Prosperity, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE (2014) (explaining that nearly 100 countries are enacting laws that will protect
both citizens and non-citizens, when data is being transferred through limitations on where
certain data may be transferred, unlike the United States).
235 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1978-79 (detailing the effect that rising global
privacy standards will have on future international data transfer negotiations); Natasha
Lomas, EU-US Privacy Shield Now Officially Adopted but Criticisms Linger, TECHCRUNCH
(2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/12/eu-us-privacy-shield-now-officially-adoptedbut-criticisms-linger/.
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negotiations; insurance; and time delays, among other things.236 In response,
Apple and Facebook have both advocated for the United States to adopt privacy
laws in a similar manner to the European Union.237
While some scholars have correctly noted that the FTC operates as a de facto
common law and promotes this structure of privacy law development,238 this is
insufficient to sustain increased international data protection and privacy
standards. Under the FTC, nearly all cases end in settlement agreements, thereby
setting no legal binding precedent.239 This practice is unsustainable and lacks the
function of creating legally binding precedent necessary to develop privacy law
in the United States.240 Though settlements resolve disputes and hold companies
accountable, the development of privacy law remains stagnant.241 Additionally,
the rise of legal threats adversely impacts the government’s motivation to
increase international data transfers due to high transactional costs and threats.242
Instead, third-party countries are shaping privacy law in a way that significantly
impacts U.S. businesses.243
The advocates for a common law approach to develop privacy law in the
United States neglect to take into account the significance of data as a global
commodity.244 For example, while the courts in the United States have been
reluctant to grant standing for privacy claims absent actual pecuniary harm,
See Tourkochoriti, supra note 33, at 161-64 (2014); see also Shimp, supra note 225.
See Mehreen Khan, Apple and Facebook call for EU-style privacy laws in US,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/0ca8466c-d768-11e8-ab8e6be0dcf18713.
238 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 600, 602, 605-07 (analyzing how the FTC
has emerged as the most influential privacy and data protection authority in the United
States with an increasingly expanding jurisprudence. The FTC has led to the development of
industry standards and best practices that companies are liable to comply with).
239 See id. at 620-21 (explaining that though the FTC has led to greater enforcement of
privacy policies, the majority of its cases end as settlements).
240 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 842-44 (discussing some of the drawbacks to the FTC’s
structure of privacy enforcement and suggestions on how it must develop to remain
effective); United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975) (reasoning
how the Court did not need to determine whether 15 U.S.C. §§21(l) and 45(l) “permit the
imposition of daily penalties.”).
241 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 842-43 (explaining that confidential terms through
private settlements limit available guidance on how to develop U.S. privacy law).
242 See Coase, supra note 125 (detailing the adverse impact on overall wealth due to
unnecessary wealth allocation deterrents that minimize the efficiency of economic decisionmaking).
243 See Ashford, supra note 169.
244 Contra Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294 (promoting the bottoms-up
approach to developing privacy law in the United States, which consists of a slow, common
law approach); The New Data Protection Laws, ISLE OF MAN INFO. COMMISSIONER (June
2017), https://www.inforights.im/media/1389/new-data-protection-laws-summary-june2017.pdf.
236
237
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international courts are willing to use long arm statutes to pursue international
privacy claims.245 Though these rulings do not directly impact privacy law in the
United States, the FTC’s common law approach to privacy cannot remain in its
current state due to the increasing international expectations.246 Instead,
Congress should lower the hurdles that the FTC must overcome in promulgating
nationwide and industry wide rules governing data privacy and protection.247
B. The FTC: The United States’ DPD
As the de facto governing body for consumer data in the United States, the
FTC has entrenched itself as the nation’s regulatory body for consumer data.248
The FTC was originally given authority based on the necessity to regulate
technology at a time of exponential technological innovation.249 However, as
technology has evolved, the FTC’s scope of power has also evolved.250 The FTC
sets a floor for data protection by aligning corporate practices with industry
norms and expectations.251 This approach allows the FTC to expand its
authority, but it is still limited in the ways in which it may pursue a company for
its practices.252 The impetus for change revolves around Congress’ willingness
to amend the Magnuson-Moss rules to allow the FTC greater jurisdiction,
increased control over consumer data protection, and additional rulemaking
authority within this capacity.253 While Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the
FTC’s broad jurisdiction, its jurisdiction and practical ability to make rules
remains severely restrained in the data privacy context.254
245 See Fram et. al., supra note 135 (discussing the elements looked at by U.S. courts to
determine whether data privacy and breach claims have standing); see, e.g., Drinkwater,
supra note 142 (speculating on the significance of Google v. Vidal-Hall and how it may
allow for more, successful international actions for data privacy and breach).
246 Contra Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294, 2297-99; Jules Polonetsky &
Christopher Wolf, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, The US-EU Safe Harbor: An Analysis of the
Framework’s Effectiveness in Protecting Personal Privacy 1-2 (2013).
247 Contra Gathani, supra note 66, at 33 (positing that the FTC’s rulemaking authority
should reduce rather than expand); James C. Cooper et. al., Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, ANTITRUST L.J., 1091, 1101, 1104, 1110-11 (2005).
248 See Serwin, supra note 48, at 811.
249 See Berin Szoka & Geoffrey Manne, Now in its 100th year, the FTC has become the
Federal Technology Commission, TECHFREEDOM (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://techfreedom.org/post/62344465210/now-in-its-100th-year-the-ftc-has-become-the/.
250 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2246.
251 See id. at 2266.
252 See id. at 2265-75; but see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53.
253 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2263, 2266 (arguing that the FTC has only
scratched the surface of its powers’ reach and should continue to stretch its bounds. The
FTC must keep pace with the constantly evolving issues of data protection and
technological innovation).
254 See id. at 2289; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
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Scholars have compared the FTC’s current development to that of a common
law system, but this is too slow and incremental to keep pace with the everchanging technological environment.255 Perhaps in more stagnant areas of law
this would suffice, but data privacy law is best assessed in an international
context rather than as an issue confined within the bounds of the United States.256
While advocates for the FTC to develop its authority in a manner similar to the
common law cite compelling rationales, it would be an unnecessary effort.257
Additionally, the milder penalties and shorter probationary timeframes for
Section 5 violations suggested by the authors do not entice companies to remain
diligent in their efforts to continuously amplify their data protection
procedures.258 Especially for companies who may incidentally fall subject to the
GDPR’s provisions, preemptive actions by the FTC, rather than just reactions to
Section 5 violations, would quickly develop U.S. data privacy law standards
before international conflicts and suits can emerge.259 Accordingly, a slow
developing common-law approach is an ineffective solution to close the vast
privacy protection gap between the United States and the rest of the developing
world; mainly, the European Union.260
The ability for the European Union to quickly institute broad privacy
protections across all of its Member States has stemmed from its recognition of
the fundamental right to privacy.261 Though the United States’ Constitution does
not explicitly address personal data privacy as a fundamental right in the way
that the European Union’s Charter of Rights has evolved, Congress has the
authority to create a regulatory agency.262 But rather than create a new agency,
Congress should simply amend the FTC Act to authorize explicit authority to

255 But cf. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294 (agreeing that the FTC must expand
and develop its jurisprudence and their bottom-up approach needs to be more transparent to
benefit companies).
256 See generally A Global Standard for Data Protection Law, PRIVACY INT’L,
https://privacyinternational.org/impact/global-standard-data-protection-law (last visited
Nov. 14, 2018).
257 See generally Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2265, 2294 (describing that the
rapid growth of the data privacy law field far outpaces that of most areas of law that found a
common law approach effective).
258 See generally id. at 2298.
259 Contra id. at 2299 (explaining that because the development of global data privacy
law far outpaces that in the United States, even though persons in the U.S. remain subject to
its provisions, the area of law must develop at a rate compatible to the rest of the developing
world).
260 See generally id. at 2270.
261 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, arts. 7, 8, 2012,
O.J. C 326/02; see also Fromholz, supra note 154, at 462.
262 U.S. CONST. art. I §§ I, VII.
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the FTC over the field of data privacy.263 Additionally, there should be an
amendment of the Magnuson-Moss rulemaking standards, within the data
privacy context. Such an amendment would expedite the FTC’s rulemaking
process, such as through simple notice-and-comment procedures.264 This would
allow the FTC to quickly implement a plan to strengthen data protection across
a vast number of industries, much like how the DPD raised its standards for all
of the E.U. Member States, based on industry input and concerns.265 Rather than
continuing to state best practices or issue consent decrees, which do not create
any substantive law, the FTC would be able to more easily promulgate legally
enforceable data protection standards that best serve industry practices.266 If the
FTC adopts a similar hybrid of DPD and GDPR, standards of uniformity can
begin to develop across multiple industries across the entire United States.267
Broadly, the FTC could implement a uniform rule that would require every
company processing consumer data to create, maintain, and implement data
protection measures throughout all their business operations.268 The FTC should
provide additional specifications which could then be further defined to raise
data protection and quality requirements in response to the developing world.269
By the end of an allotted compliance period, data protection in the United States
will have risen to a level that reduces the growing gap between U.S. and E.U.
data privacy and security laws.270 While not ideal, the GDPR’s approach is the
263 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 44, at 606 (stating that in the FTC, the United
States has the basic framework in place for a data privacy and protection regulatory regime;
however, limitations on its effectiveness occurs through a lack of express power to occupy
the field and to develop rules).
264 Contra Gathani, supra note 66 (criticizing the FTC’s use of its best practices power
as a way to circumvent the procedural guidelines for promulgating binding rules under the
Magnuson-Moss Act).
265 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 32 (EC); Fromholz, supra note 154, at
469.
266 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 604-06 (describing the FTC’s current regulatory
authority).
267 See Fromholz, supra note 154, at 467-70 (illustrating that the DPD creates a blanket
coverage of privacy law over the E.U. Member States, without heed towards specific
industries and use).
268 Council Directive 95/46 art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (identifying data quality
requirements for data processors to abide by when processing personal data. Similar
provisions would provide adequate instruction for data protection standards required by
companies irrespective of their industries); see also Lawrence J. Spiwak, Insight: Digital
Privacy Requires a Cohesive Federal Solution, BLOOMBERG L. (June 13, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/insight-digital-privacy-n73014476440 (calling for cohesive privacy
and data legislation).
269 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2271 (explaining that because the
development of technology and third country data standards are unpredictable, rulemaking
authority would allow the FTC to take an active role in ensuring data protection instead of
only being able to respond to unfair and deceptive practices).
270 See id. at 2271.
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new global standard given the uniformity it creates, and the United States must
further develop its privacy laws.271 The United States must quickly progress by
beginning with increased FTC authority and rulemaking capabilities.272
The importance of privacy protection in the developing world has become
more vital in ensuring international trade relations.273 Because personal data
privacy is a fundamental right in many countries, the United States cannot
remain ignorant to this fact by simply attempting to contract around it.274 Instead,
Congress must explicitly grant the FTC authority over data processing entities
in the United States and the rights to promulgate rules.275 Once the FTC becomes
a more significant authoritative body in the data protection field, then the United
States can begin to develop its privacy laws in a fashion similar to the European
Union.276 Because United States privacy law should develop in an international
context, Congress should allow the FTC to more easily promulgate rules that
encapsulate the international aspects of data.277 Even if the burden is not
271 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 (EU) (General Data Protection Regulation); see,
e.g., Kerry, supra note 148 (mentioning proposals to Congress to adapt the Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights developed in the Obama administration as a starting point for
comprehensive privacy legislation).
272 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2289-99; see also Fred Donovan, FTC
Wants Expanded Authority in Data Security, Privacy, HEALTHIT SECURITY (July 19, 2018),
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/ftc-wants-expanded-authority-in-data-security-privacy
(FTC Chairman Joseph Simons explaining the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s
digital commerce and consumer protection subcommittee that FTC “wants the ability to
impose civil penalties in privacy and data security cases, authority over nonprofits and
common carriers, and authority to issue implementing rules under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)”).
273 See Brookman, supra note 11, at 355-56; O’Connor, supra note 115 (describing how
current U.S. privacy and data laws “put U.S. companies at a disadvantage globally as
emerging economies adopt simpler, and often more-EU style, comprehensive approaches.”).
274 Tan, supra note 22, at 662-63 (comparing the level of emphasis and significance
countries around the world place on data privacy as a fundamental right and how the United
States lags behind many countries in this respect).
275 Cf. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2289-300 (supporting the expansion of the
FTC’s authority and jurisdiction, but in a common law manner, as previously discussed in
this Note); see also Donovan, supra note 272 (FTC Commissioners advocating FTC needs
“greater authority in the privacy and data security area,” and Congress needs “to give the
agency the ability to impose financial penalties and develop ‘sensible safeguards that can
evolve with the marketplace.”).
276 Cf. id. at 2289-99 (discussing areas of regulatory improvement for the FTC and
agreeing the impetus for privacy law development within the United States is more power
and action by the FTC); see also Oversight Of The Federal Trade Commission Before the
Subcomm. on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection on Energy and Commerce,
115th Cong. 9 (2018) (statement of Rep. Bob Latta) (discussing how “it’s time to look at
ways to reduce barriers to FTC consumer protection” in relation to data privacy by helping
it move forward with rulemaking).
277 See Robert Bond, Data Privacy is going Global, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=430e4aa4-8120-4444-9fe5-d8d525ecf362
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lessened, the FTC must still promulgate a rule to shape United States privacy
law.278 Raising global privacy standards require nations, not just individual
companies, to have adequate data protections in place.279 Irrespective of if
Congress eases the burden on the FTC’s rulemaking authority, the FTC must
create a privacy rule to govern data privacy and protection within the United
States.280 The existence of this rule will help absolve potential organizational
liability for inadequate data protection practices, especially when no data
transfer agreement exists between the United States and the foreign country.281
The need for a rule is apparent, but first the FTC must address two issues. First,
whether data standards should follow a DPD approach or a GDPR approach and
second, how to ease the burden on companies when implementing this FTC
rule.282
1. The GDPR Approach: A Shortcut to FTC Success
The FTC should follow the GDPR’s approach in creating a uniform standard
for data privacy and protection to be adhered to by all the states.283 Currently,
states are acting on their own to create minimum data privacy standards and
rights.284 Like common law, interpretation of privacy law and applicable

(explaining that data protection laws in South Africa, the Middle East, Canada, and much of
Asia are heavily influenced as a result of the British Commonwealth and former British
rule).
278 Contra Gathani, supra note 66, at 31 (calling for a restraint in rulemaking so that the
free market can develop practices on its own); see Donovan, supra note 272 (FTC
Commissioner Rohit Chopra urging Congress that the FTC needs rulemaking authority so
that it can confront the risk to the economy, society, and national security of inadequate data
security and privacy.”).
279 See THE P RIVACY, supra note 61, at 280-81 (discussing how international data transfer
agreements, such as the Safe Harbor Agreement, are more successful when each country’s
individual standards adequately comply with the others).
280 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 604-06 (calling for an increase in the FTC’s
power and presence within the field of data privacy and protection).
281 See McCormac, supra note 27 (outlining proactive steps that companies should, but
do not always, take in conducting international data transfers without the protection of a
trade agreement); see also Olorunnipa et al., supra note 31 (detailing how the current
executive administration has enveloped an inward protection approach to foreign policies,
which may result in an absence of international data transfer agreements to protect
companies).
282 See Gilbert, supra note 27 (discussing the impact that the GDPR will have on
businesses globally and what steps companies should take to prepare for its impact).
283 But cf. Jolly, supra note 40 (discussing how individual states within the United States
have set their own data privacy and protection standards); see Spiwak, supra note 268
(calling for cohesive privacy and data legislation).
284 Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, supra note 109 (providing a list of the ten
states who have incorporated privacy rights within their constitutions); Aaron Mak,
Vermont, California Charging Ahead of Congress on Data Privacy Laws, SLATE (May 29,
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standards leads to inconsistencies across jurisdictions.285 This situation
resembles that of the European Union prior to its enactment of the DPD.286 The
DPD became outdated with the development of technology and as Member
States adapted their policies at varying degrees.287 This complicated trade
amongst Member States, spurring the movement for a uniform standard.288
Rather than repeat the European Union’s efforts, the United States should forego
the intermediary DPD-like-structure and instead adopt the uniformity approach
set forth by the GDPR.289
The easiest way for the United States to develop its privacy law and to comply
more effectively with rising global standards is for the FTC to make a rule setting
a uniform standard across the country.290 The DPD became obsolete because
European Union Member States set varying standards above and beyond the
minimum prescribed by the DPD; therefore, impeding trade amongst the
Member States.291 At this point, the United States has not set any sort of
2018, 2:40 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/state-level-data-privacy-laws-areleapfrogging-congress.html (discussing how Vermont implemented the first data broker law
in the country).
285 Fromholz, supra note 154, at 470 (stating that in the United States, privacy refers to a
variety of contexts, resulting in a broad understanding of privacy as a general concept rather
than in the specific context of data privacy); Amy Talbott, Privacy Laws: How the US, EU
and others protect IoT data (or don’t), ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2016, 4:11 PM),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/privacy-laws-how-the-us-eu-and-others-protect-iot-data-ordont/ (describing that privacy laws vary by state).
286 See Fromholz, supra note 154, at 468-69 (explaining that prior to the DPD, the
European Union allowed its Member States to govern their own privacy laws, which
complicated data transfers and trade amongst one another); see also Bowman, supra note 11
(detailing the structure of privacy law in the European Union prior to the enactment of the
DPD and GDPR).
287 Bowman, supra note 11 (describing the need for data privacy law reform with
changing technology).
288 Id.
289 Nick Ismail, Should the US adopt GDPR? INFORMATION-AGE (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.information-age.com/us-adopt-gdpr-123469401/ (arguing that cybercrime
demands protection similar to GDPR with strict penalties to engender compliance); but see
IBM Executives Press U.S. Lawmakers Not to Adopt EU Privacy Law, ITPROTODAY (May
15, 2018), https://www.itprotoday.com/risk-and-compliance/ibm-executives-press-uslawmakers-not-adopt-eu-privacy-law (arguing the U.S. should have privacy law tailored to
its needs and not adopt GDPR).
290 See Bowman, supra note 11 (illustrating the perpetual increase in technology signals
that global data privacy and protection standards are going to increase for the foreseeable
future, with the GDPR setting the bar); Emilio Iasiello, Will the U.S. Adopt Similar GDPR
Privacy Concerns??, CYBERDB, https://www.cyberdb.co/will-u-s-adopt-similar-gdprprivacy-concerns/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2018) (arguing for security standards in the U.S.
supervised by the FTC).
291 The data protection directive versus the GDPR: understanding key changes, GDPR
REPORT (Mar. 6, 2018), https://gdpr.report/news/2018/03/06/data-protection-directiveversus-gdpr-understanding-key-changes/ (describing data breach notification laws which
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standard; therefore, states are free to develop this area of law creating
inconsistencies.292 While critics argue that this organic development of the law
better serves the purpose of developing the law and gaining industry acceptance,
it is an unsustainable practice because data transcends the borders of the United
States.293 By taking the initiative to develop privacy law on its own, the United
States can avoid international lobbying for a global standard, or governing
agency for data privacy and protection.294
Data flows freely throughout the world, and the United States cannot be
complacent in its non-development as global standards continue to increase.295
If the GDPR does not create a global standard, scholars have posited that the
United Nations should establish an international data privacy organization to
govern global data privacy standards.296 This would even further complicate the
United States’ efforts to flip the script on its data privacy standards in a zero to
sixty fashion.297 To avoid this scenario, the FTC does not need to raise U.S. data
standards to the height of global best practices; instead, standards must simply
be set to an acceptable level that is compatible for international trade absent
separate trade agreements.298 By following the path of the GDPR at a national
level rather than through a global organization, the FTC can promulgate a rule
outlining a uniform standard for data privacy without having to idly wait decades
for privacy law to develop on its own or succumb to abide by stringent global
vary by member states, became uniform under GDPR).
292 See Jolly, supra note 40 (comparing how states have chosen to approach data privacy
law and how California has set the standard among the states).
293 Compare Gathani, supra note 66, at 27 (calling for a decrease in the FTC’s issuance
of best practices standards so that industries can develop themselves), and Hartzog &
Solove, supra note 44, at 2289, 2293-94, 2296-97, 2299-300 (promoting a common law
style of privacy law development in the United States), with Gilbert, supra note 27
(explaining the global impact of the GDPR on businesses and international transactions),
and see Gallego et al., supra note 178 (discussing the implications of the GDPR on business
practices and the stringent data transfer, use, and maintenance requirements that will be
imposed).
294 De Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 173, at 315, 318-22 (advocating for an
international agency to govern global data privacy if the GDPR is not universally adopted as
the standard for countries to comply with).
295 Solove & Schwartz, supra note 116, at 897, 900, 902 (contending that the United
States’ current privacy law regime is unequipped to remain viable in international data
transfers).
296 De Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 173, at 315, 318-22.
297 See id. at 316-19 (noting complications that a global organization would face in its
development, and the burden it would have on countries, such as the United States, that
would have to significantly amend its privacy law framework to adhere to any standard
established).
298 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1974-75; Graham Greenleaf, International Data
Privacy Agreements after the GDPR and Schrems, 139 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 1,
2, 5-6, 8 (2016) (describing how the U.S. can shape trade agreements; however, the E.U.
may not negotiate away privacy rights).
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standards.299 An FTC rule to effectively meet global data privacy standards
would significantly lessen the burden on industries to comply.300
2. Easing the Burden of Implementation for an FTC Rule
While certain aspects of an FTC rule should be roughly based on the standards
set by the GDPR, the FTC must decide how to best implement a rule without
overburdening companies and industries.301 The GDPR’s standards for data
privacy and protection are burdensome to implement, especially in the United
States where the existing standards are far inferior.302 While the GDPR limits
liability for non-compliance in third-party countries to only those organizations
that collect or process the personal data of E.U. citizens, the continual
globalization of information and data threatens to envelop nearly all businesses
across the globe.303 The FTC does not need to emulate such a burdensome
standard; instead, the FTC only needs to set its standards at a level adequate to
comply with, and protect those effected by, the GDPR.304
Currently, most organizations lack information about the GDPR’s expansive
and stringent provisions.305 On one hand, many companies that operated under
the Safe Harbor Agreement have already prepared for international data trade
absent a negotiated agreement between the United States and the European

299 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 86, at 586, 589-90 (arguing that the FTC has developed
a common law that can serve as a basis for a data privacy regulatory regime).
300 Id. at 669, 672-73, 675-76 (arguing that the FTC is well poised to make meaningful
data privacy regulation).
301 Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy
and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1185-86, 1226 (arguing that FTC
guidance is needed for the rapidly progressing Internet of Things industries).
302 Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements: The
Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 92 (2017); Griffin Drake,
Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding EU Data Privacy Compliance Amidst a Sea of
Uncertainty, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 164, 178, 184-85 (2017).
303 See Gallego et al., supra note 178 (discussing how the GDPR only applies to United
States organizations when they process the personal data of E.U. citizens, yet the constant
spread of information projects that every business will cross paths with this sort of data at
some point); see also Gilbert, supra note 27 (stating “[t]hus, any website or mobile
application that promotes goods or services and is available for access by EU/EEA based
individuals is within the scope of the GDPR”).
304 See Gallego et al., supra note 178; see Foley Hoag LLP, FTC Seeks to Hold
Companies to GDPR Promises, JDSUPRA (July 11, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-seeks-to-hold-companies-to-gdpr-60206/
(discussing the FTC’s role in making sure that U.S. companies live up to GDPR standards).
305 Merrion, supra note 204 (noting how the majority of businesses throughout the world
lack preparation for the GDPR and uninformed of its implications and potential impacts on
international business dealings).
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Union.306 However, with uncertainty surrounding the viability of the Privacy
Shield, companies are left to prepare for trade in compliance with the GDPR’s
heightened standards absent negotiated international trade agreements.307
Alternatively, companies that have not worried about international trade
compliance and who were not affected by the Safe Harbor Agreement and the
DPD may soon find themselves within the GDPR’s scope.308 Even though an
FTC rule prior to the GDPR’s implementation is not feasible, the FTC should
set a timeframe for compliance soon after to prevent companies from being
subject to harsh non-compliance liability.309 While the burden of implementing
new policies required under an FTC rule may seem staggering to companies, it
is slight in comparison to the GDPR’s penalties and potential economic
benefits.310 To ease the burden of implementing more stringent standards, an
FTC rule should require the creation of data privacy organizations and
compliance units at an industry-wide level rather than on a per business basis.311
Proponents for allowing individual businesses to create their own data privacy
compliance programs fail to take into account cost feasibility for smaller
organizations, and the effects of varying industry practices.312 Only larger firms
306 McCormac, supra note 27 (explaining how the “Safe Harbor” framework provided
companies with a “simplified process for the transfer of personal information from Europe
to the U.S.”).
307 See Scott, supra note 32; see generally Nancy Harris, A practical guide to the
European Union’s GDPR for American businesses, RECODE (May 16, 2018),
https://www.recode.net/2018/5/16/17360944/gdpr-us-business-eu-european-union-dataprotection-privacy (discussing the various methods companies are using to prepare for the
extensive GDPR regulations).
308 See Gallego et al., supra note 178; see also Gilbert, supra note 27 (discussing the
global impact of the GDPR, both on businesses expecting the GDPR’s effects and on those
unaware of its provisions).
309 See Merrion, supra note 204 (explaining that outside of Europe only 22 percent of
firms said they were prepared for the GDPR and that there is a lack of awareness when it
comes to the impacts of noncompliance); see also Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 83(6),
2016 O.J. (L 119) 83 (EU) (stating that fines for non-compliance and violations of the
GDPR can range from the greater of 20,000,000 EUR, or 4% of annual worldwide turnover
for violations of basic GDPR principles, to the greater of 10,000,000 EUR or 2% of turnover
for other lesser violations).
310 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 84, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 83 (EU) Regulation
(EU).
311 See Gilbert, supra note 27 (explaining that implementation of the GDPR will require
“close collaboration between the industry on one end, and governments and their agencies
on the other.”).
312 Dana Simberkoff, GDPR Affects Small Businesses Too, CMSWIRE (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.cmswire.com/information-management/gdpr-affects-small-businesses-too/
(explaining that while GDPR compliance is difficult for all organizations, small businesses
face greater challenges as they “simply may not have the money to put a detailed, high-tech
security program into place”); see, e.g., How the GDPR impacts and suffocates small and
medium businesses, I-SCOOP (2016), https://www.i-scoop.eu/gdpr/gdpr-small-mediumbusinesses/ (explaining the unintended negative impacts of the GDPR specifically on small
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have the capital necessary to quickly establish the requisite data protection
departments and to hire the necessary personnel.313 Expected costs attributed to
increased data protection requirements, especially for companies without
preexisting standards, are quite high, making it nearly impossible for smaller
businesses to comply in their own in a timely manner.314 Additionally,
compliance by only a portion of the industry complicates domestic dealings
within the industry due to the inability to ensure equal levels of data privacy and
protection between companies.315 A lack of standard policies would either
inadvertently lead to GDPR violations or create numerous data screening
obstacles to ensure adequate protection throughout its life cycle.316 Instead, the
FTC’s rule creating data protection agencies would spread the costs so that more
businesses could guarantee compliance, establish industry data standards, and
be relieved of the burden of tracking developments in international privacy
law.317
Not all companies were subjected to the GDPR upon its implementation.318

businesses and how those businesses can prepare for GDPR regulations).
313 See Ray Schultz, The Price of Compliance: Study Uncovers GDPR Costs,
MEDIAPOST (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/309342/theprice-of-compliance-study-uncovers-gdpr-costs.html (explaining how new hires that will
help with GDPR compliance will cost firms hundreds of thousands of dollars).
314 See Simberkoff , supra note 312 (“GDPR compliance is certainly no small
undertaking, and it will require a major shift for many companies, particularly for smaller
organizations that may not have privacy programs in place.”); see also Coase, supra note
125 (discussing the impact of heavy burdens and transactional costs on effective, and
efficient, financial decision-making).
315 See Daniel Mikkelsen et al., Tackling GDPR compliance before time runs out,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/ourinsights/tackling-gdpr-compliance before-time-runs-out (explaining how “many aspects of
GDPR will be gradually resolved through industry practices and codes of conduct.”); see
also Allen Pogorzelski, GDPR Coping Strategies: Keeping Calm and Working Toward
Compliance, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2018/08/23/gdpr-copingstrategies-keeping-calm-and-working-toward-compliance/#31d07f3e1a02 (stating that 15%
of companies are completely ignorant to GDPR standards, whereas 15% are strategically
choosing not to comply).
316 See Sara Degli-Esposti & Maureen Meadows, GDPR: 10 easy steps all organisations
should follow, SILICON REPUBLIC (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/gdpr-coventry-university (explaining how the
GDPR “is about improving industry standards” and ensuring organizations are “not alone”
in their compliance efforts).
317 Gilbert, supra note 27 (“In the next two years, we hope to have the opportunity to
receive and analyze guidelines and comments from the various bodies responsible for the
interpretation and enforcement of the GDPR to assist with the transition to the new data
protection regime of the EU/EEA. In the meantime, it will continue to be a challenge to
comprehend and interpret the new rules created by the GDPR.”).
318 See id.
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However, businesses must approach GDPR compliance as if it will affect them
within the next few years.319 The FTC should ease the burden of implementation
by using its promulgated rule to address GDPR compliance at the industry level
rather than by attempting to distinguish between which individual business will
be affected and when.320 This approach would ease compliance with the GDPR
because appropriate safeguards of data involved in transfers between countries
can rely upon the approval of codes of conduct.321 Industry standards for data
protection and GDPR compliance industry agencies will better protect all United
States businesses from GDPR violations.322 The FTC already publishes industry
best practices; therefore, a rule creating industry agencies to monitor data
protection and compliance standards is not far beyond the FTC’s current
operations and is vital to the development of the United States’ privacy law.323
IV. CONCLUSION
Technological developments continue to ease and increase the collection,
maintenance, storage, and transmission of data.324 Within seconds, companies
can collect and transmit data all across the globe.325 However, with large data
comes immense liability as more countries and their citizens become concerned

Id.
See Nate Lord, What is GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)? Understanding
and Complying with GDPR Data Protection Requirements, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 19,
2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulationunderstanding-and-complying-gdpr-data-protection; see generally Merrion, supra note 204
(explaining how the GDPR affects all industries and compliance efforts need to account for
this fact).
321 See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 49, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 64 (EU); see also Myers,
supra note 182 (explaining that though not contained in the DPD, the GDPR allows the use
of codes of conduct to demonstrate GDPR compliance while still allowing for a selfregulated structure. To qualify, codes of conduct “may be prepared by associations or other
bodies representing controllers or processors, and may be drawn up to address many aspects
of the GDPR including international data transfers.”).
322 See Myers, supra note 182 (“Adherence to these codes of conduct by controllers or
processors not otherwise subject to the regulation, but involved in the transfer of personal
data outside the EU, will help a regulated controller demonstrate adequate safeguards.”).
323 See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
(last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (outlining what the FTC does to protect and educate
consumers).
324 See Shangquan, supra note 2 (discussing economic globalization through the rise of
big data); James Wickes, Why Life Under GDPR will Encourage Technological Innovation,
INFO SEC. (June 21, 2018), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/gdprencourage-technology/.
325 See Pologeorgis, supra note 2 (discussing the rise of international trade in correlation
with the continuous development of the use of technology in everyday business); see Cory,
supra note 231 (explaining that the “increased digitalization of organizations . . . has
increased the importance of data as an input to commerce” in the modern global economy).
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with personal data privacy and protection.326 Leading the pack is the European
Union, which strengthened its stance on data privacy and protection through its
enactment of the GDPR.327 The GDPR is the new global standard that affects
any and all nations that involve the controlling or processing of personal data for
E.U. citizens.328 Nations must prepare to comply with these strengthened
standards; otherwise, their business can be held liable.329
When it comes to data privacy law, the United States is inept because, unlike
the rest of the world, it fails to approach this rapidly expanding legal field.330
Rather than stay on top of data privacy law, Congress continues to allow the
FTC, a regulatory body not designed to develop law, to serve as the United
States’ primary data privacy and protection authority.331 This structure will
likely soon fail as the rapid growth of international regulations threatens to
adversely impact international data transfers and trade.332 Growth in the United
States’ protectionist policies could further frustrate efforts to negotiate
compromises that allow for an assortment of international trade industries.333 As
the predominant data privacy authority in the United States, the FTC must
promulgate a rule to spur increased United States data protection standards to
prevent U.S. companies from falling behind within the global economy.334
326 See Brookman, supra note 11, at 356 (explaining how consumers are calling for
stronger limitations on commercial data collection).
327 The EU General Data Protection Regulation Questions and Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 6, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-dataprotection-regulation; See Data Protection in the EU, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en (explaining
that “the regulation is an essential step to strengthen individuals’ fundamental rights in the
digital age,” such as the fundamental right to data protection).
328 See Gallego et al., supra note 178 (discussing the territorial scope of the GDPR and
how it affects businesses located outside of the European Union).
329 See id.
330 See Brookman, supra note 11, at 367 (explaining how “Congress has failed to make
meaningful progress on statutory data privacy reform in recent years”).
331 See id. at 359 (explaining that despite the FTC’s vigilance, Congress must act in
certain areas of privacy law); O’Connor, supra note 115 (discussing how the FTC has
“attempted to establish a data-security baseline through over sixty different enforcement
actions”).
332 See McCormac, supra note 27 (discussing how “the different approaches of the EU
and the US toward data privacy have created compliance challenges for businesses seeking
to transfer personal information about customers and employees from Europe to the US”).
333 See, e.g., Toluse Olorunnipa et al., supra note 31 (speculating on current protectionist
approaches towards foreign relations and how it may affect the negotiation of future
international trade agreements).
334 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2289 (agreeing that the development of
privacy law within the United States is dependent upon the scope of the FTC’s authority and
its jurisdiction); FTC Releases Annual Privacy and Data Security Update, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/01/ftcreleases-annual-privacy-data-security-update (“The Commission is the nation’s primary

2018]

The Tortoise and the Hare of International Data Privacy Law

125

Absent Congress passing a federal data privacy law, or easing the MagnusonMoss rules, the FTC must face the burden of promulgating a rule governing data
privacy and protection.335 The implementation of uniform data standards across
the states would ease domestic trade because businesses and industries would all
need to remain compliant with one national standard.336 Additionally, the
creation of industry agencies would allow industries to adapt beyond the set
general standards needed to comply with international trade inherent within the
industry.337 It is evident that the United States must improve its data privacy laws
to keep pace with the rest of the world, and through the FTC, it is possible.338

privacy and data security enforcer.”).
335 See 15 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (stating that regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission are subject to hearings and judicial review); see generally Understanding the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, MLM LAW,
https://www.mlmlaw.com/library/guides/ftc/warranties/undermag.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2018).
336 See John M. Culbertson, The Folly of Free Trade, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 1986),
https://hbr.org/1986/09/the-folly-of-free-trade (explaining that free exchange only occurs
when there is a uniform framework of laws and regulations); Hartzog & Solove, supra note
44, at 2248 (agreeing that the development of privacy law within the United States is
dependent upon the scope of the FTC’s authority and its jurisdiction).
337 See generally EU Compliance: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
GEMALTO, https://safenet.gemalto.com/data-protection/data-compliance/european-union-eucompliance/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (discussing the effect that the GDPR will have on
U.S. companies); see Jeff John Roberts, The GDPR Is in Effect: Should U.S. Companies be
Afraid?, FORTUNE (May 25, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/24/the-gdpr-is-in-effectshould-u-s-companies-be-afraid/ (explaining the “Brussels Effect” which involves the EU
creating its own regulations and other states around the world eventually raising their
standards to match that of the E.U.’s).
338 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 44, at 2294 (advocating for greater FTC presence
within the field of data privacy law to raise U.S. data protection standards); Harris, supra
note 307 (explaining that the GDPR impacts companies around the world and has become
the data protection law that has received the greatest attention).
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